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I. INTRODUCTION
In American legal tradition, causation has represented a critical
logical link between an alleged wrongful act and any injury for
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which civil liability may be imposed.' Throughout its history, the
requirement of cause has led to extraordinarily difficult questions
of both fact and law.2 These questions have been particularly com-
plicated in the context of liability under the federal securities laws.
This complication arises both because Congress and the federal
courts traditionally have adopted inconsistent approaches to causes
and because of the manner in which Congress and these courts
recently have interacted in resolving causal and related issues.'
The Securities Act of 1933 (the '33 Act)5 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the '34 Act)6 provide investors with a variety
of rights of action. Many of these rights are premised on the mis-
representation or omission of information in the purchase or sale
of a security! The misrepresentation rights discussed below are
"private" in that they may be exercised by investors themselves
rather than by some governmental entity acting on the public's
behalls In some cases, the language of one or more of the applicable
federal securities statutes expressly describes the ability to sue pri-
vately." In other cases, the federal judiciary has implied the existence
' Cf. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 132 (1927) ("Causal Fel:10011 is DIC
universal Factor common to all legal liability."); S. SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW 109 (1987) ("A basic Feature of all legal systems is that a party's behavior ;oust have
been what has here been called a necessary cause of au accident for liability to be found.").
8 See infra notes 23-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of both the reasons for
the causal requirement and the difficulties it its execution.
• See infra notes 104-115 and accompanying text.
1 See infra notes 337-57 and aconnpanying text.
• Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-771)1) (1988).
" Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988).
• In this article, For purposes tti. convenience, these rights will be referred to as "mis-
representation rights." Such rights include ilutse based on sections I I, 12(2), and 17(a) of
the '33 Act, sections 1800 and 29(1)) of the '34 Act, and rule 10b-5 under the '34 Act. This
article omits discussion of the express private right provided under section 9(e) of the '34
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988) (tee generally Silberberg & Pollack, Are the Courts Expanding the
AlearAng of "Manipulation" Under the Federal Sect, lilies Laws?, II SEC. REG. L.J. 265, 206-67
(1983)), and any implied private rights available under '34 Act § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1988),
§ 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988), or § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(I) (1988) (see generally Scott, A
Broker-Dealer's Civil Liability to Investor, for Fraud: An Implied Private Right of Action Under Section
15(r)(1)4 the Securities Exchange Act of 1931.63 lun. L.J. 687 (1988). Although these sections
are applicable to instances of' misrepresentation or omission as those terms are used its this
article, arty rights existing under these sections are more specialized than those with which -
this article primarily is concerned. In addition, the lack of settled precedent regarding the
existence and/or interpretation of certain of these rights renders discussion more speculative
than is desirable.
8 For a brief description of the various aspects of governmental enfirrce ment of the
federal securities laws, See 1 T. HAZEN, Tint LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 9.5 (2d ed.
1990).
" E.g., '33 Act § I I, I S U.S.C. § 77k (1988) (see infra notes 123-49 and accompanying
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of a private right of action, primarily on the basis of perceived
legislative intent.'"
Although courts have determined the existence of implied pri-
vate rights by reference to congressional desires, they have deter-
mined the scope of such rights somewhat differently. In deriving
the elements of implied private rights based on misrepresentation,
federal courts have tended to seek precedent primarily in state
common law." As a result, one can easily distinguish legislative and
judicial attitudes toward the role of cause. For decades, Congress
has demonstrated considerable flexibility in dealing with causal re-
quirements, treating them as means rather than ends. 12 In contrast,
courts have been extremely timid in relaxing the traditional "but
for" requirements of the common law."
In the last few years, however, courts have signaled a sporadic
willingness to disregard common law traditions." At the same time,
text);.'33 Act § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988); '33 Act § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988)
(see infra notes 150-78 and accompanying text); '34 Act § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988); '34
Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988); '34 Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (see infra
notes 179-95 and accompanying text). This article also will view section 29(b) of the '34 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1988), as giving rise to an express private right of action. See infra notes
196-210 and accompanying text.
") E.g., '33 Act § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988) (see infra note 217 Inc a discussion of
the dubious nature of any such right); '34 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. * 78j (1988) (see infra notes
217-90 and accompanying text); '34 Act § 13, IS U.S.C. § 78m (1988); '34 Act § 14, 15
U.S.C. § 78n (1988); '34 Act § 15, IS U.S.C. 78o (1988). The existence of some of these
rights is firmly established but the existence of others is not. See generally Hazen, Implied
Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death Knell nor a Moratorium—Civil Rights,
Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 Vast). L. REV. 1333, 1339-43 (1980); Maher, Implied
Private Rights of Action and the Federal Securities Laws: A Historical Perspective, 37 %Vasil. & LEE.
L. REV. 783, 789-808 (1980); Pitt. Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A
Leaky Ship on Troubled Waters. 34 Bus. LAW. 117 (1978); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of
Action Under Federal Law. 55 NOIRE. DAME L. REV. 33, 33-44 (1979).
" See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975); Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); List v. Fashion
Park, Inc.. 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 1759-63 (2d ed. 196 1 ); 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REcuLicrtore 3880 (2d ed. Supp.
1969); Merritt, A Consistent Model of Loss Causation in Securities Fraud Litigation: Suiting the
Remedy to the Wrong, 66 TEx. L. Rev. 469, 471 (1988); Wheeler, Plaintiff's Duty of Due Care
Under Rule 10b-5: An Implied Def use to an Implied Remedy, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 561, 575-83
(1975). For Inuits on this Itli:11102, however, see Globus v. Law Research Service, 418 F.2d
1276, 1291 (2d Cir. 1969) (noting that securities laws are to be interpreted liberally, and that
there "need not be present all of the same elements essential to a common law fraud"), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Note, The Reliance Requirement in Private Actions Under SEC Rule
106-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584, 585 n.7 (1975) (noting that "the fraud provisions in the SEC
acts ... are not limited to circumstances which would give rise to a common law action for
deceit") (quoting 3 L. Loss, .cupra, at 1435); see also the authorities cited infra note 14.
12 See infra notes 58-77 and 211 and accompanying text.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 285-90.
14 For instance, in both Affiliated the Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54
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they intermittently have embraced arguments based on currently
popular economic theories. 15 As an unintended consequence, gen-
eral legislative and judicial approaches to cause have been somewhat
less divergent.
Nonetheless, there is no genuine trend toward uniformity in
the treatment of cause. For instance, recent developmentsw reveal
that in cases involving the express misrepresentation rights, the
strength of demands that the plaintiff establish causation varies
inversely to the strength of demands that he or she demonstrate
privity with the defendant. 17 The implied misrepresentation rights
simply do not follow this pattern, suggesting the existence of a
perplexing systemic inconsistency.'" The primary focus of this ar-
ticle is this and other systemic inconsistencies involving cause and
the misrepresentation rights.'"
Part II of this article provides background on theories of cau-
sation and the general roles of cause in regulatory schemes. 2" Part
111 briefly describes the causal requisites of each of the misrepre-
sentation rights under the federal securities laws, attempts to ac-
count for their differences, and suggests a method by which these
(1972), and Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-45 (1988), the Supreme Court liber-
alized the hitherto strict causal requirements imported into rule 101)-5 from the common
law tort of misrepresentation. See infra text accomitanying notes 239-48; see also Bateman
Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 307 (1985) (inappropriate to invoke
broad common-law barriers to relief where a private suit serves important public purposes);
Herman & MacLean v. fluddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388 (1983) (reference to common-law
practice can be misleading). Courts also have indicated a somewhat increased willingness to
rely on express causes of action in resolving such matters as appropriate statutes or limitation,
rather than regarding the common law as dispositive. See infra text accompanying notes 232-
33.
See, e.g., Latham', 485 U.S. at 246-47 (favorable discussion a the efficient market
hypothesis but without wholehearted endorsement). For examples of general reliance on this
theory by the federal circuit courts of appeal, see also Lipton v. Documation, Inc, 734 F.2d
740, 743 (11th Cir. 1984); T.J. Raney & Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb. Oklahoma Irrigation Fuel
Auth., 717 F.2d 1330, 1332 (10th Cir. 1983); Panzircr v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365, 368 (2c1 Cir.
1981), vacated .sub nom. Price Waterhouse v. Panzirer, 459 U.S. 1027 (1982); Shores v. Sklar,
647 F.2d 462, 471 (5th Cir. 1981), tea. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1982); Mackie v. Barrack, 524
F.2d 891, 903-06 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See infra notes 244-49
and accompanying text.
1 " See infra notes 154-56, 162-66 and accompanying text.
17 See infra text accompanying notes 211-16.
1 " See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
19 An analysis or causation, and the roles it plays in the private rights based on misre-
presentation, assists in the identification of models useful in predicting and shaping the
Future of the misrepresentation rights themselves. Such an analysis also generally provides
valuable information about the interactive decision-making processes employed by Congress
and the courts. Discussion of these processes is a secondary purpose of this article.
" See infra notes 23-114 and accotnpanying text.
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differences can be reconciled. 2 ' This method involves development
of models premised on the causal requisites of the express misre-
presentation rights and use of these models in structuring the im-
plied misrepresentation rights. Part IV addresses the principal
problems confronted under this method, most of which are the
result of recently exhibited and perhaps temporary congressional
behavior. 22
II. THEORIES AND ROLES OF CAUSATION
A. Theories of Causation
In order to compare the approaches to causation respectively
employed by Congress and the federal courts, one must investigate
the traditional parameters of the concept of cause. This investiga-
tion provides both definitional background and insight into the
possible motivations underlying the respective choices made by leg-
islatures and the judiciary. As an initial step, it is useful to separate
the component of cause-in-fact from the component of cause-in-
law. 23
I. Cause-in-Fact or "But For" Causation
At common law, one familiar manner of framing the requisite
factual connection between a defendant's act and a plaintiff's injury
is that "but for" the defendant's bad act, the plaintiff's injury would
not have occurred.''' Nonetheless, courts have developed a more
modern formulation to address difficulties that arise where the facts
suggest that two or more causes exist." This formulation is the
2  See infra notes 115-359 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 360-73 and accompanying text.
2' See, e.g., H.L.A. HART' & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN TIIE LAW 79-102 (1959); Calabresi,
Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for finny Kalven, Jr., 43 U. Cm. L. REV. 69,
71-73 (1975); Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543. 548-
49 (1962); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 97-99 (1956).
21 Malone, SUPra note 23, at 65; see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 41, at 239 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter "PROSIER & KEETON"].
2" See, e.g., Anderson v, Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 432, 179
N.W. 45, 46 (1920) (either of the two fires that merged and destroyed plaintiff's property
might have caused the destruction),
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"material element" or "substantial factor" test, 26 which asks whether
the defendant's conduct was a material element and a substantial
factor in bringing about the plaintiff's injury. 27
Inquiries about cause-in-fact cast in terms other than those of
these relatively simple formulations tend to be somewhat
confusing28 and to require rephrasing depending on context. None-
theless, alternate formulations sometimes appear, often concealing
concern with factors other than strict factual causation. For instance,
in the context of private actions for fraud, 29 courts have tended to
frame their primary inquiry into cause as the question of whether
the plaintiff reasonably relied on the defendant's misstatement."
20 See id. Prosser & Keeton argue that the substantial factor test is an improvement over
the "but for" test because it leads to the same results as the "but for" test where the latter is
applicable. It also applies to situations where the "but for" test is not useful, such as multiple
cause cases. PROSSER & KEtrox, supra note :24, § 41, at 240; accord I J. DOOLEY, MODERN
TORT LAw § 8.02 (1982). Nonetheless, commentators have found the substantial factor test
itself problematic where there are possible multiple causes but only one cause-in-fact exists.
See Zwier, "Cause in Fact" in Tort Law—A Philosophical and Historical Examination, 31 DE PAUL
L. REV. 769, 803 (1982); Malone, supra note 23, at 88-97.
" See, e.g., Dunham v. Village of Canisteo, 303 N.V. 498, 513, 104 N.E.2d 872, 880-81
(1957); Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 146 Minn. 430, 432, 179 N.W. 45,
46 (1920), overruled, Borshiem v. Great N.R. Co., 149 Minn. 210, 183 N.W. 519 (1921);
Carney v. Goodman, 38 Tenn. App. 55, 62, 270 S.W.2d 572, 575 (1954); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF Tans, §§ 431, 473 (1964).
The most consistently meaningful forms of the "but for" and "substantial factor" inquiries
appear to be as follows. In the case of the "but for" test, if the defendant had acted in
accordance with its duty, would the plaintiff's injury have taken place? In the case of the
"substantial factor" test, was the defendant's failure to comply with his or her duty a material
dement and a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm? These fornudations
apply both where the plaintiff's injury may be the result of the defendant's affirmatKe act
and where it may be the consequence of duty-breaching inaction. Thus, where a defendant
employer has failed in its statutory duty to provide its employees with protective goggles, it
is meaningful to ask "had the defendant provided protective goggles, would the plaintiff's
eye have been injured?" Where the defendant has punched the plaintiff in the face, it !flakes
sense to ask "was the defendant's failure to act peaceably towards the plaintiff a substantial
factor in bringing about the plaintiff's black eye?"
" Cr, Dombeck v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co., 24 Wis. 2d 420, 425, 129 N.W,2d
185, 188 (1964) (court required to grapple with whether speed of train was cause of fatal
accident where either more or less speed would have avoided contact).
" As used in this article, the term "fraud" will refer to common-law causes of action or
include reference both to common-law causes of action and to the misrepresentation rights.
" In the federal securities context, see, e.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577, 585-
86 (3d Cir. 1975); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d 221, 230 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 905 (1970). Other courts, however, have separated actual and justifiable reliance
and dealt with them as separate elements. See, e.g., Roche,. Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402,
409 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). Although, as
indicated in the text, the primary causal inquiry involves reliance, courts also may inquire
into the relationship of the misrepresentation and the extent of the loss suffered by the
plaintiff. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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This fcirmulation translates poorly when the alleged fraud is the
result of omission:3' Perhaps more troubling, it merges the question
of cause-in-fact with a policy concern about whether the plaintiff
has acted in a particular desired manner.32 If one must articulate
this latter concern in causal terms at all, it is more clearly a matter
of proximate, rather than factual, cause.33
From time to time, courts have varied not only the formulation
of the cause-in-fact inquiry, but also the rigor of the required dem-
onstration that factual causation exists. The plaintiff usually must
introduce evidence from which reasonable persons might conclude
that it is more probable that the injury in question was caused by
defendant's conduct than that it was not.34 For some recently iden-
tified purposes, however, a certain level of statistical correlation
between two occurrences may suffice to sustain liability if the de-
fendant is unable to disprove the existence of cause.35
• "' Among other things, this formulation seemingly requires the plaintiff to prove con-
templation of the non-existence of the undisclosed facts, as well as the speculative acts that
he or she would have taken had full information been received. See Merritt, supra note I I,
at 472 n.8. C./. Affiliated Utc Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152-54 (1972) (proof
of materiality may substitute for proof of reliance in a case based on misrepresentation by
nondisclosure).
Note, however, that a particular formulation may also reflect assumptions about the
kinds of injury that most frequently take place in particular circumstances. Thus', for instance,
there is some comm011 sense appeal to an assumption that the usual injury arising from a
falsehood has to do with misleading the plaintiff. When such an assumption is inappropriate
(as where the fraud is on the market, rather than on the individual), however, the formulation
should change. See generally infra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
B ut see infra note 55.
See, e.g.. State of Maryland v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., 176 F.2(1 414, 418 (4th
Cir. 1949); Simpson v. Logan Motor Co., 192 A.2(1 122, 123-24 (D.C. 1963); Macintosh v.
Great N. Ry. Co., 151 Minn. 527, 529, 188 N.W. 551, 553 (1922). Where the probabilities
are no better than evenly balanced, the coulL will direct a verdict for the defendant. See, e.g.,
Altrichter v. Shell Oil Co., 161 F. Supp. 46, 49 (D. Minn. 1958); Lane v. Hampton, 197 Va.
46, 49, 87 S.E.2d 803, 805 (1955). In the case of common-law fraud, a "clear and convincing"
standard of pro( tf. frequently is applied to all elements ofthe plaintiff 's case. This was rejected
for puiposes of civil liability under the federal securities acts in Herman & MacLean v.
I•iuddlest on, 459 U.S. 375, 390 (1983).
TIi is is the case, for instance, where a manufacturer is held liable on the basis of
market shalt of the product causing the plaintiff's injury. See, e.g., McCormack v. Abbott
Laboratories, 617 F. Sum). 1521, 1524 (D. Mass. 1985); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 613, 607 P.24 924, 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 146, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980);
see also Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 339, 343 N.W.2d 164, 170, cert. denied, 469
U.S. 833 (1984); Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 396, 398, 473 N.E.2d 1199,
1200 (1984). COMM BUT' 11Side v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa. Super. 264, 297, 505 A.2d 973,
986 (1985). See generally Note, Compensating Victims of Occupational Disease, 93 HARV. L. REV.
916 (1980); (5munent, DES and a Proposed 'Chewy of Enterprise Liability, 46 FounitAM L. REV.
963 (1978).
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Variations of this sort in the rigors of proof may have policy
rationales as simple as a need to provide viability to a cause of
action.''' Discussions of cause-in-fact, however, often fail to address
these matters directly. This circumlocution serves both to impale
progress in resolving policy issues and to hamstring courts and
litigants dealing with confusing precedent.' Part Ill provides ex-
amples of such difficulties in the federal securities area.
2. Cause-in-Law or Proximate Cause
The concept of cause-in-law constitutes a policy-based adjust-
ment to the concept of cause-in-fact." Thus, where a defendant's
conduct is, under the standards discussed above, the factual cause
of a plaintiff's injury, the court nonetheless may decline to impose
liability by invoking notions of social utility. For instance, where a
defendant's action did play a critical role in some Rube Goldberg"
chain of events that led to an unpredictable injury to the plaintiff,"
36 For examples of this phenomenon in rte federal securities context, see Basic, Inc. v.
Levinson, 458 U.S. 224 (1988), and Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United Slates, 406 U.S. 1281
(1972), discussed infix notes 239-43 and 244-48, respectively. In the common-law tort
context, examples are provided in "clearly established double fault and alternative liability"
cases (see PROSSER & KEETON..11/PM tote 24, § 4, at 271). See, e.g., Murphy v. Taxicabs of
Louisville, Inc., 330 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Ky. 1959); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 81), 84, 199
0.2c1 I, 5 (1948), overruled, Skald! v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 1).2d 924, 163
Cal. Rptr. 912, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Eratodjian v. Interstate Bakery Corp., 153
Cal. App. 24 590, 608, 315 1 1 .2d 19, 29 (1957); see also Simla!, 26 Cal. 3d at 613, 607 0.2d at
938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (in products liability context, damages apportioned among defen-
dants based on market share of injurious product unless cause disproved by defendant).
39 See Greets, Proximate Cruise In Texas Negligence Law, 28 Tex. L. REV. 471, 474-90
(1950) (discussing problems of Texas courts in reconciling concepts of proximate and factual
cause).
" See, e.g., Merritt, SUP111 11111e 1 L at .51)1; Malone, supra note 23, at 97.
39 Rueben Lucius (Rube) Goldberg (1883-1970) was, among other things, a cartoonist
famous fur his drawings or inventions designed to achieve simple results by roundabout
means. See generally Wm) Was Wm, IN AMERICA 160 (Marquis. Who's Who, Inc. 1976).
As one 01111111C111/1(01' pointed out, unfo reseeable injuries may include those occurring
to unforeseeable plaintiffs or to foreseeable plaintiffs in unforeseeable ways or to unforesee-
able extents. Calabresi, supra note 23. at 93-100.
Palsgraf v. Long Island H.R. is a classic example or a case in which the facts implicate the
doctrine of proximate cause. 248 N.Y. 339, 352, 162 N.C. 99, 103, 'dig denied, 249 N.Y. 511,
164 N.E. 564 (1928). In Palsgraf, railroad employees negligently assisted a passenger boarding
a train, causing him to drop an unlabeled package containing fireworks. The fireworks
exploded, causing scales on the other side of the platform to fall upon a nd ittittre Mrs.
Palsgral The court concluded that the railroad was not liable. Interestingly, however, the
court chose to articulate its conclusion in terms of Else railroad's duty, not in terms of
proximate cause. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
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a determination that imposition of liability would be unfair or oth-
erwise undesirable may lead a court to conclude that the ad in
question was not a sufficient or "proximate" cause-in-law of the
injury with which it was linked factually."
Generally, the determination of proximate causation promi-
nently features some evaluation of the foreseeability42 of undesira-
ble outcomes." According to some commentators, although it is
socially beneficial to encourage defendants to calculate the costs of
their actions in terms of foreseeable injuries to others, there is no
valid purpose in forcing a reckoning with unpredictable events."
This emphasis also may express some conclusion about the defen-
dant's moral culpability. In fact, both courts and commentators
frequently have noted that where intentional wrongdoing is in-
volved, the proximate cause requirement may become quite atten-
uated. 45
Traditionally, however, issues of causation, proximate or oth-
erwise, will not arise unless the defendant has breached a duty-
" See, e.g., Johnson v. Greer, 477 17.2d 101, 106 (5th Cir. 1973) (proper focus is on
"logic, fairness and justice"); Captozal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 77-78, 222 A.2d 513, 517
(1966) (basing determination on "mixed considerations of logic, common sense, justice, policy
and precedent"). Accordingly, proximate cause commonly is treated as a question of law,
whereas cause-in-fact commonly is treated as a question for the trier of fact. See L. GREEN,
SUPTU note I, at 135-41 (1927); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 24, § 42, at 244
(proximate cause is a question of law).
" See Calabresi, supra note 23, at 81.
13 This evaluation may take the form of delineation of "zones or risk" or the like. For
Purposes of this article, however, it is unnecessary to distinguish among formulations using
foreseeabilit y, duty-risk, or other terminology. For more extensive treatment of these dis-
tinctions, see generally Calabresi, supra note 23, at 91-100; Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v.
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAtt L.
REV. I, 27-32; Note, When Cause-/n-Fact is More than a Fact: The Malone-Green Debate on the
Role of Policy in Determining Factual Causation in Tort Law, 44 LA. I.. Rev. 1519, 1520-25
(1984). For a discussion of various early formulations of proximate cause, see generally Beale,
The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Fluty. L. REV. 633 (1920); Edgarton, Legal Cause, 72
U. PA. L. REV. 211 (1924); McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 HARV. L. REV. 149 (1925); Smith,
Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103 (1911).
" See Calabresi, supra note 23, at 81 ("Thus, in terms of collective deterrence the
argument for a foreseeability requirement excluding many causally linked actions from
liability is very strong."). Sec infra note 70 and accompanying text for the argument that
forcing any such reckoning in fact would impose wasteful transaction costs.
45 See, e.g., Shades Ridge Holding Co. v. Cobbs, Allen & Hall Mortgage Co., 390 So. 2d
601, 609 (Ala. 1980) ("[E]ven very remote causation may be found where the defendant
acted intentionally."); Derosier v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 81 N.H. 451, 464, 130 A.
145, 152 (1925) ("For an intended injury the law is astute to discover even very remote
causation."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or TORTS § 4358, comment a (1964) ("[Rlesponsibility
for harmful consequences should be carried further in the case of one who does an inten-
tionally wrongful act than in the case of one who is merely negligent or is not at fault.").
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acted or failed to act in some specified way.'" To some extent,
evaluations of both foreseeability of outcomes and moral culpability
also can be subsumed in articulations of the defendant's duty." This
is particularly apt to be the case where a private cause of action is
premised, either expressly or impliedly, on a statutory requirement
or prohibition." Accordingly, a careful initial statement of the de-
fendant's duty easily can reduce the need for additional policy
forays, including those implicating foreseeability and blame."
3. Special Judicial Applications of Cause in Actions for Fraud
Many of the courts specifically considering the role of cause in
actions for fraud have developed special applications of the general
concepts outlined earlier in this Part. 5° First, they ask whether the
allegedly fraudulent statement caused the plaintiff to enter into the
49 See, however, Prosser and Keeton's statement that "duty is only a word with which
we state our conclusions and no more. - PROSSER & KEF.TON, supra note 24, § 43, at 281.
Another way of articulating the statement in the text is that requisite "fault" must be
established. "Fault," however, dues not necessarily involve moral reproach; it nay mean only
that there has been a departure from the conduct desired by society. See Seavey, Speculations
as to" Respondeat Superior," 11 ARV AND LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 442 (1934). But see Keeton, Conditional
Fault in the Lam of Torts, 72 14say. L. REV. 401 (1959) (arguing strict liability, viewed as liability
without fault, is founded on a moral concept of "conditional fault'); see also Calabresi, supra
note 23, at 82 ("Is lank not designed to select from an infinity or causally linked actions
those which are by definition not worth doing, that is, wrongful or tortious?") (emphasis in
original). In United Slates v. Carroll Towing Co., Judge Learned Hand proposed a formula for
determining the point at which fault might exist, 159 E2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). In A
Theory of Negligence, Posner re-articulated the Learned Hand formula in strict economic
eras. 11 LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
44 In fact, depending on a given comes approach, the overlap may be relatively complete.
See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island KA., discussed supra note 40; see also PROSSER & KEETON,
iltpra note 24, 42, at 274 ("[AIll of these questions are, in reality, one and the same.").
One might note in response to Prosser and Keeton's complaint that "duty" is a
conclusion, suptvi note 46, that the conclusion in this circumstance at least has been drawn
legislatively.
49 This may account for the lack of any rigorous discussion of the concept of proximate
cause in the securities field. See generally the several discussions of causal elements in Part
II infra,
so See Merritt, supra note II, at 495-500. According to Merritt, a majority of cases
dealing with common-law fraud adopt an approach approximating that described in the text,
albeit without the specific terminology of "transaction causation" and "loss causation." This
specific terminology has become popular in the context of modern cases involving fraud
under the federal securities laws. See, e.g., Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 457,
463 (2d CM), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507
F.2d 374, 380-82 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975); In re Washington Pub.
Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 650 K Supp. 1346, 1351 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd, 823 F.2d
1349 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Catanella Sec. Litig., 583 K Supp. 1388, 1414-15 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
Merritt also notes, however, that a significant minority of common-law cases do not make
the kind of distinction described. Merritt, supra note 11, at 496, 498-500.
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transaction in question, often casting their inquiry in terms of
whether the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the suspect statement.51
If so, the element of "transaction causation" is established." Next, the
courts inquire into "loss causation"—whether the injury complained
of (typically a decline in the price for which the item acquired by
the plaintiff may be sold) is attributable to the untruth of the state-
ment for which the defendant is being sued, or is the result of sonic
other factor, such as an unforeseeable accident or general market
forces. •
This two step process may be illustrated as follows: if a plaintiff
proves that he or she would not have purchased a particular piece
of property had it not been for a false representation that the
property was commercially zoned," transaction causation is estab-
lished. If the property has been resold for substantially less than
the amount the plaintiff paid, partly because it is not commercial
property and partly because all property values in the area have
suffered a decline, loss causation exists with respect to the former
component of the plaintiff's loss, but not with respect to the latter.
Translated into the terminology previously introduced, the in-
quiry into transaction cause is an inquiry into "but for" causation."
If the defendant had dutifully told the truth, the plaintiff would
not have entered the transaction, thus avoiding any loss associated
with the property. Accordingly, the inquiry into loss causation may
be seen as an attempt to limit liability in some manner conforming
to a perception of what is fair or useful to charge to the defendant:
in other words, an exercise in proximate cause."
0 In the securities context, see, e.g., Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175. 186
(3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938 (1982); Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462, 470 (5th Cir.
1981) (en bane), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1102 (1983); Huddlesion v. Herman 8c MacLean, 640
F.2d 534, 549 n.24 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, rey'd in part on other grounds, 459 U.S. 375
(I 983).
52 See cases cited at tupra note 50.
" This hypothetical assumes, for purposes of sitnplicity, that the plaintiff's failure to
inquire further was not unreasonable. With respect to the requirement that a plaintiff's
reliance be reasonable, see generally Gabaldon, Unclean Hands and Self-Inflicted Wounds: The
Signifkanee of Plaintiff Conduct in Actions for Misrepresentation Under Rule 106-5, 71 MINN. L.
REV. 317, 319-27 (1986).
"4 See Iluddleston, 640 F.2d at 547-49.
55 See, e.g., Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale Sec. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20
(2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066 (1987); In re Catanella Sec. Litig., 583 F. Supp.
1388, 1414-15 (ED. Pa. 1984). Nonetheless, limitations related to loss causation in this
context also may respond to the idea that the plaintiff might have bought some other piece
or property and SU Ifered some genend decline in investment value even if the defendant
made no misrepresentation—a type of "but for" causal concern because, had the defendant
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There are circumstances, however, in which the differentiation
between transaction and loss causation does more to confuse than
illumine. lf, for instance, the transaction simply would have gone
through at a different price had the truth been told, then the
transaction cause concept is not helpful. In this case, loss causation
itself is a "but for" inquiry presumably directed at determining the
difference between the actual price of the transaction and the hy-
pothetical price at which it would have taken place had the truth
been known. Therefore, it may be more helpful in these circum-
stances to abandon the transaction/loss vocabulary and to refer only
to some such concept as causation of transaction price.
4. The Distinction Reconsidered
Both the foregoing discussion and the traditional proximate/
"but for" dichotomy more or less presuppose some virtue to a
distinction between policy considerations and the identification of
cause-in-fact. One such virtue is clarity in dealing with policy." In
addition, does value exist in starkly revealing the outlines of cause-
in-fact? In other words, should legislatures, courts, and commen-
tators really be preoccupied with the existence of factual cause?
a. Cause as a Means to Other Ends
In some private rights of action, the element of factual causa-
tion itself probably is used to establish some rational limit on a
defendant's possible liability." In most cases, this use of factual cause
may not be necessary because liability already is limited effectively
performed his or her duty, an injury still would have been sustained. Sec supra text accom-
panying note 30.
56 Disclosure could, of course, affect some term other than price. Nonetheless, the
example of price is used throughout this article for purposes of simplicity.
" See supra text accompanying notes 33-34.
5" As the court noted in Math v. Johnson, infinite liability fur wrongful acts would "set
society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation." 58 Minn. 242,245,59 N.W. 1012,
1012 (1894); see also Zwier, supra note 26, at 773 (" MA's fault principles are deemphasized
the cause in fact requirement may be the only major hurdle facing plaintiff's attempt to
secure recovery."). The relevant worry also may be the imposition of manageable limits on
the work of the courts. Concern with limiting litigation has, for instance, been a consistent
theme throughout the development of rule 10b—S case law. Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723,739-49 (1975) (discussing the possibility of vexatious litigation).
Some courts have cited the adoption of the scienter standard as alleviating this problem. See
infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Straub v. Vaisman and Co., 540 E.2d
591,597 (3d Cir. 1976).
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by the requirement that the plaintiff's injury be foreseeable." There
are circumstances, however, in which it is foreseeable that any of a
number of plaintiffs might be injured, but certain that not all of
them will be. Thus, a defendant's duty-breaching actions might pose
a foreseeable risk to one thousand individuals," but actually result
in injury to only two or three."' Overcompensation and overdeterr-
ence might result if courts permitted all individuals within the zone
of risk to bring a cause of action. At the same time, dividing the
monetary value of two or three average causes of action among the
thousand individuals placed at risk is a distinctly unsatisfying prop-
osition for at least two reasons. First, those individuals who are
injured by the defendant's act will not be fully compensated.° Sec-
ond, division of a cause of action is likely to mean that no individual
plaintiff will have an appropriate incentive to file suit. In other
words, a type of "free rider" problem is created 63
The requirement of cause-in-fact also may serve as a method
of allocating private lawsuits among appropriate defendants. For
example, if each of two manufacturers of the same product occa-
sionally produces defective merchandise purchased by the same
group of possible plaintiffs, the element of factual causation assures
that not all suits are brought against the wealthier manufacturer,
or the one that consumers have most often sued successfully in the
past. This outcome presumably has the effect of appropriately im-
pressing all possible defendants° with the need for caution."'
3" Foreseeability of injury may be incorporated into either the definition of the defen-
dant's duty or the parameters of proximate cause.
U' Here, the fact that risk is created presumably is defined as a breach of duty.
"' For instance, this might arise where two or three defective products are produced
out of every 1000 manufactured. However, the statement in the test disregards the damage
such as mental suffering or increased insurance rates that exposure to risk may occasion
even where no other injury is sustained.
"2 If, however, there are other individuals who have suffered injuries not caused by the
defendant, they nonetheless may need compensation from some source. In other words, why
should the plaintiff who was lucky enough to be injured by reason of flanunable pajamas be
favored over one who was struck by lightning? For discussion of this and related issues, see
infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
"3 "Free rider" or "public good" problems are the result of a reluctance to engage in
what would otherwise be optimal levels of a particular activity because the benefits of the
activity must be shared. See generally C. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAN' AND ECONOM ICs
27-28,98 (1984).
14 In some circumstances, it may be potential plaintiffs who are to be impressed. Thus,
given the requirement of cause-in-fact, no purchaser of flammable pajamas will be encour-
aged to regard them as a form of lire insurance.
GO There is, of course, less need for such a requirement where courts have adopted a
pooling approach to liability. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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The foregoing explanations of factual causation as means to
desired ends are related to one well-known commentator's assess-
ment that lig is simply a useful way of toting up some of the costs
the cheapest cost avoider should face in deciding whether avoidance
is worthwhile.""6 Part IIA(5) below presses this type of means-end
explanation, based on desired effects on behavior, to a stark con-
clusion with specific reference to liability for misrepresentation.
b. Other Factors°
Nonetheless, it is difficult to address all historically identifiable
requirements of cause-in-fact in precisely the means-end terms just
described." For instance, cause-in-fact (or lack thereof) typically
justifies the following outcomes: Assume that "X" is a nonnegligent
individual struck and killed by defendant "W's" unlawfully speeding
car, and that "Y" is a nonnegligent individual killed by lightning in
the split-second before being hit by that same speeding car. A court
typically would permit the survivors of "X" to recover against "W,"
but would preclude an action by the survivors of "Y" on the basis
of lack of "but for" cause. Because neither driver nor decedent
could anticipate the intervention of nature, however, any traditional
means-end explanation based on desired effect on behavior is not
apt to sustain such a distinction.
A distaste for windfalls to plaintiffs69 might explain these di-
vergent outcomes. Such distaste may be understandable in terms of
"" Calabresi, supra note '13, at 85.
"7 See generally G. CALABRESI, TIIE COSTS ox AccmENTS 297-99 (1970) (discussing soci-
ety's requirement or a it relationship between injurer and injured in terms of
retribution anti other factors).
In add4km, cost avoidance theories semi] mildly strained as explanations for the
ill111111Se of legislatures to attach higher sanctions to "completed" crimes, such as murder,
than to "attempted" crimes, such as attempted In lie See infra note 92 and accompanying
text. The strictly economic approach described in Part II AS, infra, labels the punishment of
inchoate crimes "puzzling." See R. PosNEtt, EcoNomic ANALYSIS OF LAW 172 (2d ed. 1977)
(the criminal sanction is a method of pricing conduct, hut an unsuccessful crime has no
costs).
For discussion of the appropriate extent of criminal responsibility fiw arguably resulting
consequences, see, e.g., Ryti, Causation in Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. REV, 773, 775-86,800—
05 (1958).
If this facuw were not at play, it would be mildly difficult to explain a legal system's
willingness to accept legislatively defined penalties tu)I determined by the extent M the injury
caused (and payable into the public ptwket) while at the same time spawning a judiciary
determined to avoid a similar result when the penalty is payable to an individual. Note,
however, that legislatures do sometimes provide fin. "wind fall" payments into private pockets.
See, e.g., section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (treble damages for certain
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reluctance to compensate the survivors of "Y" as long as the survi-
vors of "Z," an individual struck by lightning when no car is in
sight, have no remedy. The juxtaposition of the "X," "Y," and "Z"
hypotheticals, however, certainly suggests that there must be either
a windfall to the defendant saved by lightning or a windfall to the
survivors of the person felled by it. Because there does not seem to
be very good reason to prefer negligent or reckless defendants over
the survivors of innocent decedents, something else must validate
this result. Simple avoidance of litigation expense supplies one ex-
planation for why costs should lie where they fall, but this rationale
is unaffected by the presence or absence of "but for" cause!"
An alternate explanation is based on the idea that private causes
of action have a retributive component requiring causal relationship
as a matter of inherent morality. 71 Such an argument demands
intuitive recognition that defendants "deserve" to be liable only for
results that they, rather than forces of nature, etc., have "caused."
In fact, more than one scholar has traced the cause-in-fact require-
ment in private rights of action to the vengeance customs of ancient
peoples. 72
antitrust violations); section 16(1) of the '34 Act (discussed infra note 97); infra text accom-
panying note 319.
7" Justice Flohnes himself gave minimization of administrative costs as the reason for
letting the costs lie where they fall unless some clear societal benefit is achieved by shifting
<them. See O.W. HoLmEs, JR., THE COMMON Law 76-77 (Howe ed. 1963). One such benefit,
()I' course, would be compensation; atiother would he deterrence.
'' The impulse of legislatures to attach higher sanctions to "completed" crimes than to
"attempted" crimes seems to reflect some notion of a moral value inherent in the establish-
ment of causal relationship. See supra note 68 and infra note 92 and acco mpanying text; see
also the justification discussed by Calabresi, supra note 23, at 79. The rather commonly
articulated concept that someone subject to punitive sanctions is "paying a debt to society,"
when combined with the fact or sliding-scale punish menus, suggests that social debts are
larger when undesirable results actually are achieved. (7: C. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL.
LAW Cll. 1 (5th ed. 1936) (A crone is an offense against the public at large, and the purpose
of a criminal proceeding is to protect and vindkate the interest of the public as a whole).
This analysis has a distinctly retributive flavor. The whole "debt" concept, moreover. suggests
that retribution at times may be a kind of compensation to a societal psyche injured by reason
of tear, outrage, or the like. This reasoning ties well into recent treatment of individuals
trading ots the basis of inside information. See infra note 332 and accompanying text.
"2 See Zwier, supra note 26, at 781: 0.W. flouttEs, JR., supra note 70, at 7-8; Wigmore,
Responsibility fbr Tatham Acts: Its HiAtury, 7 Ham L. REV. 315,316-18 (1894). For a general
discussion of the retributive value or cause-in-fan requirements in the field of tons, see, e.g.,
C. Calabresi, supra !tote 67, at 298-99: Chapman. Ethical Issues in the Law of Tart, 20 U.W.
ONTARIO L. REV. 1,6 (1982) ("[A]spects of the retributive theory [of tort liability) seem ...
to loom large in explaining the legal concern for cause-in-fact."); Zwier, supra, at 784 ("fTlhe
cause its fact requirement can be traced to the desire for vengeance.").
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Commentators also have explained the prolonged popularity
of the requirement of cause-in-fact" as consistent with the ultra-
individualist tradition in which the American judiciary is steeped."
After all, if the state properly may interfere with the liberty of
individuals only when they have interfered with the liberty of Others
through force or fraud,'" cause-in-fact can be regarded as a vital
mechanism to assure that the predicate interference has occurred,
thus restraining the action of the state."
The political model of the minimalist state, however, now has
lost a considerable amount of acceptance." To the extent that this
model can no longer theoretically justify the cause-in-fact require-
ment, something else must explain the requirement's continued
attraction for courts or other decision makers choosing to apply it.
This "something else" could be one of the more naked forms of
means-end analysis, simple devotion to precedent, or intuitive ac-
ceptance of the retribution theory described above.
5. The Strict Economic Approach
One well-known, if fairly recent, school of thought seeks to
explain and evaluate legal developments in terms of movement
toward economic efficiency. In this sense, a result is efficient if those
benefited gain more than is lost by those detritnented." The effi-
ciency analysis is unaffected by whether or not there is actual cony
" See Zwier, supra note 26, at 784-96.
R. POUND, THE SPIRIT os"rnr. COMMON LAW 37 ('1921) ("What is peculiar to
American legal thinking, and above all to American legal thinking, is an ultra-individualism,
an uncompromising insistence upon individual interests and individual property as the focal
point of jurisprudence."). (4. I W. Brae. KSTI)NE, COMMENTARIES 38-43 (priMary purpose of
all Inunan laws is protection of individual rights). See generally L. Fut_sEll, TIIE MORALITY OF
LAW 96-106 (1964).
13 See A. Ilitowx, MODERN POLITICAL Fintrosoenv 88, 92 (1986) (describing classical
libertarian philosophy); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 26-28, 149 (1974); Zwier,
supra note 26, at 791.
'" This discussion is, of course, a type of means-ends analysis not based on desired
behavioral effect.
71 See, e.g., Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV.
44, 69 (1941) (the modern inclination is to a "universalistic philosophy of values according
to which the community is superlir to the individual").
See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE or TORT LAW 16 (1987). The
medical postulates a model of pre-act bargaining between would-be perpetrator and victim
to determine whether the crime is econ omic (that is, whether the would-be perpetrator
willingly would meet the victim's demanded price), but also recognizes that in the case of
many crimes there is no Feasible advance negotiation. R. PUSHER, supra note 68, at 166. See
generally id. at ch. 13.4, on the merits of ex ante vs. ex post control in such circumstances.
1044 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 31:1027
pensation moving from the benefited to the detrimented because it
is overall, not individual, wealth maximization that is sought. 7" Al-
though this school acknowledges that wealth distribution concerns 80
may be addressed even at the expense of efficiency,"' it regards the
court system as a relatively inferior reclist•ibutional mechanism. 82
Assuming that the purpose of a given body of law is promotion
of economic efficiency, "a defendant's conduct will be deemed the
cause of an injury when making him liable for the consequences of
the injury will promote an efficient allocation of resources . . . .
When it would not promote efficiency for the defendant to behave
differently, the cause of the accident will be ascribed to an 'act of
Gocl'." 83 Pursuant to strict economic analysis, then, the idea of cau-
sation is itself quite dispensable, except insofar as it represents a
traditional vocabulary with which lawyers and judges may feel com-
fortable while grappling with efficiency concerns."
Accordingly, in determining the measurement of liability, an
economist would bypass cause and inquire directly whether an ac-
tivity such as misrepresentation has adverse economic conse-
quences.85 The typical conclusion has been to the effect that mis-
7" A result efficient in this sense is to be distinguished from one that is pareto preferred.
W. CANOES & R. POSNER, supra note 78, at 16. A result is pareto preferred if no change can
make someone better off without making someone else worse off. Id.; see also A.M. POLINSKY,
AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983).
"" According to A.M. Polinsky, supra note 79, at 7, "[Elfficiency corresponds to 'the size
of the pie,' while equity has to do with how it is sliced. Economists traditionally concentrate
on how to maximize the size of the pie, leaving to others—such as legislators—the decision
how to divide it." For criticism of the excesses of the strict economic approach toward this
dichotomy, see, e.g., Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, Sophistry or Self-
Indulgence?, LXVIII PROC. Buff. Acne. (1982).
"l A.M. POLINSKY, supra note 79, at 105-13.
52 Id. at 110-13; R. POSNER, supra note 68, at 404-05.
"" W. LANDES & R. POSNER, SUpra note 78, at 229.
84 Id.
"5 In the case of nondisclosure, however, a different analysis prevails. Although nondis-
closure by the least-cost provider of information suggests the existence of diseconomies in
the form of search costs incurred by less efficient producers of information, disclosure itself
imposes both mechanical costs and costs in terms of disincentives to the production of
information. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fische!, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors,
70 VA. L. REV. 669, 681-82 (1984). This is, of course, a kind of "public good" or "free rider"
problem. See supra note 63. Moreover, many legal economists postulate that marketplace
competition generally will bring about disclosure without the need for legal enforcement
mechanisms. See KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE: REGULATION IN SEARCH OF
A PURPOSE 117-33 (1979); R. PosNEtt, supra note 68, at 83, 332-34. For a summary of the
earlier literature addressing the effect of regulation on the market for new issues, see G.J.
BENSTON, CORPORATE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE IN THE U.K. AND THE U.S.A. (1976). For a
defense of mandatory disclosure systems, see, e.g., Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System,.70 VA. L. REV. 717, 748-49 (1984). The argument
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representation imposes dead losses on society, including the risk of
resource misallocation, the cost to the speaker of making the mis-
representation, and the cost to others of attempting to uncover it.8"
There!bre, a penalty is merited in an amount sufficient to deter the
making of the misrepresentation. Moreover, because misrepresen-
tation involves concealment, the possibility that the uneconomic act
will go undetected requires an ofTsetting increase in the amount of
the penalty.87 The optimum penalty amount thus will be somewhat
in excess of any individual gain anticipated by the party making the
misrepresentation.'" Correspondingly, this optimum amount also
may exceed any loss "caused" by the undesirable act. The decision
as to who should collect the penalty is a matter of less interest to
the economist and presumably is to be determined by some other
competent decision-maker by reference to equity and other consid-
erations.89
6. Summary of Theories of Causation
In summary, causation fulfills several purposes that vary in the
eye of the beholder. To some, causal relationships may represent a
crucial, if intuitive, link without which punishment (or other legal
responsibility) may not be morally imposed. Others may regard such
based on marketplace competition often leads to the conclusion that affirmative disclosure
should not be mandated except in the limited case where disclosure is necessary to keep
other revealed in From being misleading. There, it seems that the analysis pertain-
ing to misrepresentations more properly would apply.
"" See W. LANDES & R. POSNER, supra note 78, at 154; R. PosNER, Apra note 68, at 81;
Easterbrook & Fisch el, supra note 85 ,i it 673-80; Wolfson, A Critique of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 30 Bunn' U. 119,129-31 (1981).
Typically, misrepresentatitm also will involve a wealth transfer which, as an "equity"
issue, itself is relatively uninteresting to the legal economists. See .cupra note 80; see also W.
LaNnEs & R. PosNER, supra note 78, at 255. This might involve a transfer from the deceived
to the misrepresenter or, in some cases, between two third parties. For instance, a misrepre-
sentation made by the issuer of securities into an existing trading market affects sales to
which the issuer is not party. In the case of misrepresentations relating to new issues of stock,
there also is some danger of nnsadoranon of investment funds. See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders,
and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 limtv. L. REV. 322, 334-36
(1979). In the long run, however, the dangers of misallocation presumably would be overcome
by sufficient investigation by investors.
87 See, e.g., W. LANDES & R. POSNER, WPM nOIC 78, at 160. See generally Becker, Crime
and Punishment; An Economic Approach, 76,1. POI,. ECON. 169 (1968).
See, e.g., Calabresi & Melatned, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HAIM L. REV. 1089, 1125 (1972) (discussing additional reasons for
optimal penalties to exceed objective valuations of the (lefendant's gain).
"8 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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relationships as necessary to the preservation of individual auton-
omy and the restraint of the action of the state.
Nonetheless, many commentators acknowledge that at least
some aspects of cause are not inherently valuable, but rather are
means to ends. Thus, for instance, both proximate cause and cause-
in-fact at times may constitute methods of limiting liability while
impressing upon possible defendants the need to evaluate the net
benefits of their actions from both internal and external viewpoints.
One should recognize, however, that if any given decision-maker
views cause as no more than a means to an end, other methods of
achieving the same goal often will be available, sometimes offering
greater simplicity or different advantage.
B. Roles of Causation in Regulatory Schemes and in Private Rights of
Action Based on Those Schemes
In devising a regulatory scheme," a legislature may address its
goals in at least two general ways. First, it may choose to prohibit
or require behaviors actually causing specific outcomes. 9 ' Second, it
simply may regulate actions without reference to the attainment of
particular results. For instance, a legislature concerned about violent
deaths might outlaw murder (intentional activity resulting in death
of another), and attempted murder (intentional activity directed
toward the death of another but falling short of that result), as well
as discharge of a firearm in populated areas (intentional or unin-
tentional activity merely risking injury or death of another)."
A legislature sometimes may regulate activities without regard
to any necessary result simply because it finds the activities them-
"" As used in this article, the term "regulatory scheme" refers to legislation directly
addressing the behavior of those who are not governmental employees. 'the conduct of
employees also typically will be implicated, at least by way of a duty to enforce.
"' For purposes of convenience. except where otherwise indicated, the regulatory models
discussed in Part II of this article are based on prohibition rather than mandate. Part III
will focus on the federal securities regulatory scheme, which is a hybrid of prohibition and
mandate.
"1 In making these regulatory choices, such a legislature often would take pains to
outdate the strength of enforcement mechanisms, i.e., severity of punishment, and the
regulated party's actual attainment of undesirable results. Thus, for instance, murder may
carry a higher penalty than attempted murder. See, e.g., Mouri. PENAL CODE § 5.05(1) (1985)
(characterizing an attempt to commit a capital crime or first degree felony as a felony of the
second degree); id. § 6.06(1)—(2) (establishing a longer term of imprisonment for first degree
felonies than for those of the second degree). See Calabresi, supra note 23, at 79 for a
discussion of the use of completion of a crime as evidence of intent justifying imposition of
a penalty stronger than that imposed on an uncompleted crime. See generally Glazebrook,
Should We Have a Law of Attempted Crime?, 85 L.Q. REV. 28, 35-44 (1969); Sayre, Criminal
Attempts, 41 UARV. L. Rev. 821, 837-42 (1928).
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selves either desirable or objectionable."' Similarly, it may proscribe
or require particular behaviors without reference to their actual
results because they frequently are linked with particular occur-
rences. ," The enacting body may or may riot examine carefully
whether the usual linkage is in the nature of "but for" causation,"
or is merely a predictive relationship 96 based on observations that
undesirable event B tends to occur at the same time as, or shortly
after, event A.
Where a legislature expressly provides that a private citizen has
a right of action based on the conduct of another, it may choose to
address causal linkage in any number of ways. First, it simply might
designate certain individuals as "private attorneys general," who are
empowered to bring lawsuits for specified amounts without refer-
ence to any injury to themselves. 97 Second, it instead might require
some proof of injury but no strict demonstration that it was the
defendant's behavior that caused the injury." Alternately, it might
See Calabresi, supra note 23, at 78 n.I2 for the argument that behavior sometimes is
forbidden because some people are "shocked" by it, and that being shocked is being harmed.
See also Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 88, at 1102 n.30.
Insider trading is an example of an activity deemed by the United States Congress to be
inherently objectionable, notwithstanding voluminous writings on its economically desirable
outcomes. See infra tune 337 and accompanying text.
'' An activity such as attempted murder, described in terms of failure at an attempt to
achieve the consequence of death of an intended victim, may fall in the category of activities
proscribed as inherently objectionable insolitr as it involves formation of an inherently
objectionable intent independently worthy of punishment. If intent to kill is causally linked
with the disagreeable consequence of death of a victim, however, t he attempt might be
proscribed as a means of preventing that consequence. For discussion of the argument that
proscription of attempts has no more deterrent effect than already is supplied by proscription
of the completed act, see C. Dix & M.M. SIIARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW 555 (3d ed. 1987). A
clearer example of preventive regulation is proscription of an act, such as discharging a
firearm within city limits, because it is believed that if no firearms are discharged, no one
will die of gunshot wounds. 'The rotative strength of the proscriptions directed at various
activities may reflect an assessment about inheltIlt undesirability, as well as about the strength
of the causal rdationships involved. See generally Glazebrook, ,supra note 92..
!' See supra note 24-37 and accompanying text.
See Calabresi, supra note 23, at 71-72 for differentiation or the predictive concept of
"causal link" and the concept of "but kw" cause. Malone has argued that "proof of what we
call the relation of cause and effect ... can be nothing more than 'the projection of our
habit of expecting certain consequents to follow certain antecedents merely because we had
observed these sequences on previous occasions.'" Malone, supra note 23, at (34-65 (quoting
Paossize, l'Iminnoog oe THE LAW OF TORTS § 44, at 223 (2d ed. 1955)).
Section 16(b) of die '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 78p(b) (1988), provides one example of suck
an approach. Section 16(b) permits shareholders in specified circumstances to bring a quasi-
derivative suit for the disgorgement of short-swing profits by insiders without any demon-
stration of injury to the corporation. See generally 2 L. Loss, supra note I I, at 1037-44.
9" This might be the case, for instance, where the burden of disproving causation is
placed on the defendant. See infra notes 135 and 140 for a discussion of section I I of the
'33 Act.
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demand strict "but for" causation. 99 Presumably, the selection
among these or other variations is well-considered and designed to
reflect such factors as perceived morality, desirability of deterrence,
and avoidance of windfalls.'"" As illustrated in the federal securities
context, a variety of approaches frequently is the order of the day.'"
Even where the legislature has failed to provide expressly for
the existence of private rights, courts have implied them under
some circumstances. 102
 Generally, the process of implication involves
a scrutiny of the statutory language, the structure of the regulatory
scheme, and the legislative history for evidence of legislative in-
tent—the talisman upon which the existence of the private right is
said to depend. 103
Where courts imply a private right of action for damagest 04
from a regulatory prohibition or mandate, they clearly do not re-
gard themselves as enjoying any substantial degree of flexibilitym
in dealing with the relationship between the regulated activity and
its result.'"" One may explain this conservatism in at least two ways.
9" See supra text accompanying notes 24-37 for a general discussion of but for"
causation. See also infra notes 181-85 for a discussion of section 18(a) of the '34 Act.
""' See supra text accompanying notes 57-89.
"' See infra notes 116-215 and accompanying text.
" 12 See generally Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Law: Calling The Court
Back to l3orak, 779 Nw. U.L. REV. 227, 234-74 (1984); Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67
VA. L. REV. 553, 554-70 (1981); Hazen, supra note 10, at 1339-43. As these commentators
point out, the dominating impression of the implication process as practiced over the last
decade is one of conservatism.
1 "1 For further discussion of the factors listed in the text and other factors, such as
traditional relegation to state law, see supra note 102; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 926-43 (1988).
Except where otherwise specified, this article is limited to private rights of action for
damages or rescission, as distinguished from actions seeking non-rescissory equitable reme-
dies. Rescission logically may be viewed as a short-handed economic equivalent of certain
damage calculations even more than might be other forms of injunctive relief.
" 5 Eric Railroad Cu. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 65 (1938), abolished the notion of a
general federal common law. Commentators have widely discussed the implications of this
abolition for the power of the federal courts. See, e.g., Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the
New Federal Common Law, 39 N.V.U. L. REV. 383 (1964) (supporting a specialized federal
common law); Green, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The Sepa-
ration of Powers Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469, 488-505 (1980) (advocating private causes of
action arising from violations of federal statutes without specific congressional directive);
Hazen, supra note 10, at 1347 (no independently existing federal causes of action after Erie);
Note, Implied Causes of Action: A Product of Statutory Construction or the Federal Common Law
Power?, 51 U. Cow. REV. 355, 380-96 (1980) (advocating implication of remedies as a
matter of federal common law).
""" For illustrations in the federal securities context, see infra text accompanying notes
248-50, 260, and 286-90.
As a more general matter, courts usually do not imply a private right of action from a
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First, the process by which a private right is implied from a regu-
latory provision focuses on existence of the right, but not its shape.
This permits the courts to shape the right through allusion to
common law precedent where the requirement of cause is well
established.m Second, and more importantly, courts may regard
cause as a means of assuring that implied private rights of action
fulfill some goal other than augmentation of the deterrent and
punitive effects of the regulatory system without implied rights.' 08
This second point may be further explained as follows. In the
case of the implied rights, the legislature has performed the primary
balancing of legal regulation 109 against the benefits of the defendant
behaviors sought to be regulated.'' The express civil and criminal
penalties presumably embody the legislature's initial judgment
about appropriate deterrent and punitive levels. Thus, the theoret-
ical role left for the implied private right would appear to relate to
the plaintiff's moral right to receive compensation from the per-
petrator of his or her injury."' Accordingly, relaxation of causal
requirements to address such problems as underdeterrence might
be characterized as a type of judicial challenge to legislative com-
petence." 2 In fact, relaxation of these requirements for any reason
might constitute a distortion of the legislative scheme.'"i
regulatory measure unless they establish that prevention of the plaintiff's injury was a goal
of the enacting body. See, e.g., Con v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S  33 39 (1916); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or Touts § 874A (1964).
1, See supra note 1 for the cited authorities.
"'" This proposition is suggested by any consideration given, in the process of implying
private rights, to whether the plaintiff is "one of the class fbr whose special benefit the statute
was enacted." Cori. 422 U.S. at 78 (quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33
(1916)) (the availability of judicial relief to achieve protection of investors is a necessary
supplement to Commission action), overruled, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560
(1979); see also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
lim See generally PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 24, § I, at 5-6, § 4, at 20-26; Morris,
Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 MARV. L. REV. 1173, 1175-76, 1188-91 (1931); Morris,
Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 It.',. L. REV. 730, 731-36 (1930); Williams, The Aims
of the Lazo of Tort, 4 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 137, 144-51 (1951).
"" For examples of judicial solicitude for certain defendant activities, see generally
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, rel4 denied, 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E.
564 (1928); FIR. Mach Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 1110, 159 N.E. 896 (1928);
Ryan v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
"I See supra note 108 and the authorities cited therein for sonic evidence of this
compensatory theme in the implication of private rights.
1 " Note, however, that the legislature may welcome the courts' assistance in this regard.
See 	 notes 326-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of congressional approval of
the federal courts' development of private rights of action under rule 101)-5.
uv See infra notes 363-64 fi)r a discussion of the separation of powers doctrine.
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Nonetheless, this challenge/distortion argument loses power
upon consideration of two significant factors. First, in some circum-
stances the legislature has indicated that it does not intend to
preempt the area in which it has acted."4 Second, modern federal
doctrine premises implication of private rights upon a finding of a
legislative intent that such rights exist."' Presumably, this intent
could extend to both the noncompensatory and compensatory ef-
fects of private enforcement. It is one argument of this article that
this legislative mindset definitely prevails in the federal securities
context. It is a further argument that a legitimate source for divin-
ing legislative intent regarding any given implied private right is
the shape of the roughly analogous private rights that Congress
expressly has provided.
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR MISREPRESENTATION OR
OMISSION UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW
A. Express Rights
In enacting the '33 and '34 Acts, the United States Congress
sought to promote full disclosure and integrity in the market-
place. "6 To attain these goals, Congress required certain behaviors,
See, e.g., section 16 of the '33 Act, which stipulates that "Blhe rights and remedies
provided by this title shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may
exist at law or in equity." 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1988). Section 28(a) of the '34 Act contains a
parallel provision. 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988). Moreover, in sortie cases, the legislature has
issued specific calls for additional enforcement by way of private rights. This is the case. for
in where the '34 Act is violated through insider trading. See infra notes 319-33 and
accompanying text.
See SUM, note 103 and accompanying text.
"" The Supreme Court has "repeatedly ... described the 'fundamental purpose' of the
UM Act as implementing a 'philosophy of full disclosure.'" Basic v. Levinson, Inc., 485 U.S.
224,230 (1988) (quoting Santa Fe Indus. y.. Green, 430 U.S. 462,477-78 (1977)); see also
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. Inc., 375 U.S. 180,186 (1963). The Court also has
said that ''It] he primary objective of the federal securities laws [is] protection of the in
public and the national economy through the promotion of a ugh standard tn. business
ethics ... in every facet of the securities industry." Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. at
186-87, cited in Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299,315 (1985).
The goals of the federal securities acts most frequently identified by conmientators are
protection of the investing public from fraud and overreaching, improving investor confi-
dence in the securities markets, promoting the efficient allocation of investment funds by
enhancing the supply of publicly available of and discouraging such improper
practices as management self-dealing and insider trading. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 86.
at 334-36. Brudney argues that concern with ecotunnic allouttion is associated primarily; with
mandated disclosure, whereas concern with fairness is reflected in restrictions on fraud. See
irl. at 333-39.
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such as registration of securities and broker-dealers and the filing
of various reports, 17 and prohibited others, such as engaging in
deceptive or manipulative practices. 18 Typically, Congress called
for or precluded these behaviors without reference to any "result"
requirement; 19 that is, it imposed legal consequences on certain
acts or failures to act regardless of whether a particular undesirable
occurrence followed in any given instance.
In some cases, Congress saw fit to make accrual of a private
right of action the express consequence of particular regulated
behaviors. A "result" in terms of injury to the private party was not
necessarily made a condition of the recovery. 12" In some circum-
stances, however, the occurrence of plaintiff loss was either made, 12 '
or permitted to be made, 122 an issue. This article next discusses the
broad parameters and causal requisites of each of the expressly
articulated private rights of action based on misrepresentation.
1. Section I I of the '33 Act
a. Generally
Section 11 of the '33 Act' 29 permits the purchaserm of a se-
curity registered pursuant to a registration statement' 25 that con-
tains a material misrepresentation or omission unknown to such
purchaser' 26 to sue specified persons associated with the preparation
See section 5 of the '33 Act, IS U.S.C. § 773 (1988); section 13 of the '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78,n (1988): section 15 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1988).
118 See section 17 of the '33 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1988); section 9 of the '34 Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78i (1988); section 10 of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
1111 Section 9(e) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988), constitutes an exception to this
statement.
12" Sec infra notes 150-78 for a discussion of section 12(2) of the '33 Act. See supra note
97 for a brief discussion of section 16(b) of the '34 Act.
121 See infra notes 179-95 for a discussion of section 18(a) of the '34 Act.
122 See infra notes 123-49 for a discussion of section 11 of the '33 Act.
123 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1988).
L" The statutory reference is to "any person acquiring" the security in question. 15
U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
125 Courts have interpreted the language granting standing to any person "acquiring
such security" (15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988)) as imposing a strict requirement that the security
acquired be traced to the offering covered by the defective registration statement. See, e.g.,
Hagert v. Glickman, Lillie, Eiger & Co., 520 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (D. Minn. 1981); Feit v.
',casco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Stipp. 544, 568 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
' 2" 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1 988). In the case of section 11, the fact that the purchaser "knew
of such untruth or omission" is treated as a defense. Id.; see L. Loss, supra note 103, at 898.
Compare the treatment of the plaintiff's knowledge Mr purposes of section 12(2), infra note
153. See also infra note 139 for the genesis of the requirement.
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of the registration statement.' 27 Such a purchaser may sue for the
difference between the price paid for the security and its value at
the time of the suit.' 28 Where an issuer's securities enjoy significant
trading after issuance, the most difficult proof required of the
plaintiff may be that the security he or she acquired is "traceable"
to the registration statement.' 29 Provided the plaintiff acquired the
traceable security before release of the issuer's earnings statement
for a twelve-month period, beginning after the date of the registra-
tion statement ("the issuer's twelve-month earnings statement"),
there need be no showing of reliance on the misrepresentation or
omission.'" Even where reliance must be shown, there is no re-
quirement that the plaintiff actually have seen the registration state-
ment.""
Defendants who may be subject to section I 1 liability include
the issuer of the securities in question, the directors of the issuer,
the signers of the registration statement, the underwriters of the
securities, and experts named in the registration statement.' 32 Var-
ious defenses are available to these parties. For purposes of this
article, the most relevant'"" ones include proof that the plaintiff
127 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
12" According to section 11(e),
The suit ... may be to recover such damages as shall represent the difference
between the amount paid for the security (not exceeding the price at which the
security was offered to the public) and (I) the value thereof as of the time such
suit was brought, or (2) the price at which such security shall have been disposed
of in the market before suit, or (3) the price at which such security shall have
been disposed of after suit but before judgment if such damages shall be less
than the damages representing the difference between the amount paid for the
security (not exceeding the price at which the security was offered to the public)
and the value thereof as of the time such suit was brought: PrOvided, that if
the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other
than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the
registration statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being
true or omitting to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary
to make the statements therein not misleading, such portion of or all such
damages shall not be recoverable.
Id. § 77k(e).
12 ' See supra note 125; see also T. Hazen, supra note 8, at 73 n.I5, regarding the use of
other rights of action to avoid the tracing requirement.
''° 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1988).
1 " 1 The '34 Act added the requirement that reliance be demonstrated where the relevant
purchase occurs after the release of the issuer's 12 month earnings statement. Its drafters
believed that the '33 Act was too stringent. See 78 Cosa. REC. S8668 (daily ed. May 12, 1934)
(remarks of Senator Fletcher); see also 3 L. Loss, supra note II, at 1728.
152 See supra note 127.
"3 The most important defense for non-issuer defendants not referred to in the text is
the defense of "due diligence." See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities
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knew of the misrepresented or omitted matter,'" and proof that
some part of the decline in the security's value was attributable to
a cause other than the misrepresentation or omission."" Moreover,
in no event may the maximum amount of damages recovered with
respect to any security exceed the price at which it initially was
offered to the public.""
The bringing of a suit under section 11 is subject to various
procedural requirements, at least two of which can be quite signif-
icant. These significant requirements are the posting of security, if
required by the court, 137 and the satisfaction of a fairly short statute
of limitations. 138
b. Summary of Causal Elements
Where the plaintiff acquired his or her securities before the
release of the issuer's twelve-month earnings statement, there zip-
Acts: The BarChris Caw (pls. 1 & 2), 55 VA. L. REV. I, 199 (1969); Spanner, Limiting Exposure
in the Offering Process, 20 REV. SEG. & COMMOD. REG. 59 (1987); Note, Escon v. BarChris:
"Reasonable Investigation" and Prospectus Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of /933,
82 Flmtv. L. REv. 908 (1969).
'3' See supta note 126.
I r. See supta MAC 128 and text accotnpanying infra notes 140-4 I . See also Note, Causation
of Damages Under Section II at the Securities Act of /933,151 N.Y.C. L. REV. 217,217-25 (1976)
kr discussion of the history and operation of this defense, which was added to section 11
by the '34 Act.
13" 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988); see supra note 128. Even if the security in question has
been bought and sold several tin 'Cs, in theory, this limit should not be exceeded. Early holders
will not have been damaged unless they resold at a lower price; the damage of bter holders
would be reduced by a purdiase at this lower price. Instances in which in (and
no holdel'S ;Kinked from an early purchaser selling at a loss, held during a
period of increasing market value, and sold to a later purchaser who suffered a large decline
should be rare. Moreover, the section II defendants presumably would be able to demon-
strate that at least some part of the duplicative losses were attributable to market forces or
other causes unrelated to the misrepresentation. Section 11(e) also provides:
In no event shall any underwriter (unless such underwriter shall have knowingly
received from the issuer for acting as an underwriter some benefit, directly or
indirectly, in wind, all other underwriters similarly situated (lid not share in
poportiott to their respective in in the Underwriting) be liable in any suit
or as a consequence of suits authorized under subsection (a) kr damages in
excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and dis-
tributed to the public were offered to the public.
15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988).
I" Section I 1(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1988), also provides for this posting.
'as Section 13 of the '33 Act establishes that suits under either section II or section 12(2)
must be brought within one year after discovery of the relevant untrue statement or omission
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence and, in any event, within
three years after the security was (in the case of section II) offered to the public or (in the
case of section 12(2)) sold. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988). See infra text accompanying note 165.
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parently is no inquiry into transaction cause unless the defendant
attempts to prove the plaintiff's actual knowledge of the alleged
misrepresentation. This is a difficult burden in the context of a
public market and seems, at most, to reflect concern with avoiding
the grossest appearance of windfall, rather than any serious preoc-
cupation with issues of cause.' 39
More importantly, however, the defendant has the discretion
to raise the issue of loss causation. The statute itself does not con-
template any demonstration by the plaintiff that he or she would
not have entered the transaction "but for" the misrepresentation,
even in response to the defendant's evidence on the question of loss
causation.' 40 This combination has the rough effect, then, of pres-
uming that if the truth had been told the transaction nonetheless
would have been consummated at some price, and centering debate
on the question of what that price would have been."' In other
words, if raised by the defendant, the critical issue in this situation
actually appears to be one of causation of transaction price.H 2
If the plaintiff acquired the relevant securities after release of
the issuer's twelve-month earnings statement, he or she will be
required to introduce evidence of reliance. In other words, a form
of imprecise "but for" causation will be added as an element of the
prima Jack case. It is imprecise because it does not establish whether
the plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation or omission in pur-
chasing the security or whether the purchase simply would have
transpired at some different price. Moreover, in either case it ap-
pears that the defendant may raise the issue of loss causation.
The causal requirements of section 11, then, broadly but clearly
indicate several compatible congressional determinations. First, the
fact that plaintiffs acquiring securities not long after the release of
the defective registration statement need make no threshold causal
showing suggests a firm belief that misrepresentations in registra-
tion statements affect or "cause" transaction prices. Second, the
erection of a strong causal presumption favoring the plaintiff dem-
1 ' 9 In fact, legislative history suggests that Congress devised the "knowing plaintiff"
defense when section 1I (then designated section 9) provided for suits against "vendors,"
and intended that the defense simply function to permit innocent intermediate purchasers
to resell their securities after disclosure was made. See Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency (April 4, 1933) (statement of Arthur H. Dean), reprinted in
ELLENBERGER & MAHER, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES Ace OF 1933, SENATE
HEARINGS 148-52 (1971).
"" Nonetheless, such a demonstration is not precluded, and might be fruitful.
in The presumption, however, does not appear to be irrebuttahle. See supra note 140.
412 See supra text accompanying note 56.
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onstrates that section 1 I actions are not intended to be strictly
compensatory.m" Instead, during the period in which transaction
prices are most likely. to be affected (that is, before release of the
issuer's twelve month earning statement), individual purchasers may
be characterized as private attorneys general, as well as the persons
most likely to have suffered any injury.
The treatment of cause in the section 1 1 context also conveys
information about congressional response to certain of the previ-
ously discussed motivations for the development of the requirement
of cause. For instance, Congress has shown itself more than willing
to intrude on individual autonomy, and none too worried about the
other moral implications of cause. 144 At the same time, however,
the fact that lack of loss causation may be invoked as a defense
suggests concern with limiting liability in some reasonable rash-
ion.' 45 This concern is driven home by the imposition of a ceiling
on liability based on the price at which the securities in question
originally were offered to the public,H 6 coupled with the require-
ment that the plaintiff's securities be traced to the registration
statement of which complaint is made."' Interestingly, the resulting
exposure to liability seems to comport roughly with the economic
approach described in Part IIIA(5) above."" Thus, the penalty
''' See Note, Causation Under Section I I , upra note 135, at 219; (I. Globus v. Law Research
Sen., Inc., 418 F.2(1 1'276, 1285, 1288 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 997 U.S. 913 (1970);
Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 033,43 YALE 11 171, 173-77 (1933); Shulman,
Civil Liability and the Semitic, Art, 43 YALE L.I. 227, 247-53 (1933). Because of the difficulty
of disproving cause, even injury-Dec plaintiffs sometimes may recover.
' 0 This conclusion is part-and-parcel of the overall structure of the federal securities
law, The individual rights proponent generally would endorse state-enforced restrictions On
misrepresentation (an act depriving another of the ability to exercise lice will (see supra text
accompanying note 75)), btu presumably would disapprove mandated registration and dis-
closure. Given the reliance of Congress on these mandates in its general approach to securities
regulation. it indeed would he somewhat incongruous fm- that body to have resorted to
libertarian philosophy to resolve interstitial issues.
1 ° It also may be a way of charging plaintiffs with market risks ordinarily associated
with investment. See infra note 215.
H" Imposition of such a ceiling effectively limits the liability of issuers and underwriters
to the amount they received from the sale. By contrast, the liability of other defendants will
not be limited by their lack of individual benefit in connection with the sale.
'•'' This pattern leads to the tempting conclusion that, in this instance, Congress has
adopted something of an "unjust enrichment" approach to liability. This conclusion is accu-
rate only in the grossest sense, however, in view of the limitations (including causal requisites)
traditionally imposed on unjust enrichment recoveries. See notes 282-84 and accom-
panying text. Moreover, not all defendants under section 11 will have profited personally
front the misrepresentation in question. See supra note 146.
See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. This analysis (hies not purport,
however, to account for such factors as the defendant's state of mind. See supra note 133 and
f;a note 149.
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theoretically imposed equals the gain of some defendants, i.e., is-
suers and underwriters, from the misrepresentation and exceeds
that of others, i.e., directors and signers.''"
2. Section 12(2) of the '33 Act
a. Generally
Section 12(2) of the '33 Ac0 5° grants a right to rescission (or
rescissory damages)' 5 ' to the purchaser of a security offered or sold
by means of a prospectus' 52 or oral communication containing a
material misrepresentation or omission unknown to such pur-
chaser.' 5" Although the Sitpreme Court specifically has reserved the
issue,' 54 the persons against whom suit may be brought likely are
the same as those subject to liability under section 12(0.' 55 The
"1 " This may address the possible "non detection" pniblem arising where the activity in
question necessarily is concealed. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
One may draw another distinction between actions brought against issuers and those
brought against other kinds of defendants. A conduct-related defense is available to the
latter group but not to the former. See Mr, note 133. In other words, the issuer is an insurer
of the accuracy and completeness of the registration statement but non-issuers are not. The
theoretically must difficult actions, then, are likely to be those brought against non-issuers.
Thus, Congress appears to have established a scheme in which those most financially inter-
ested in the sale of securities (issuers) are given the most substantial incentives to avoid
misrepresentations or omissions. Congress has given reduced incentive to an additional group
capable of policing the registration process.
At the same time. however, one must examine this "reduced incentive" notion in light
of the fact that some potential members of this additional group may not profit personally
from a defective sale. In other words, being forced to pay damages when one has not profited
probably is a more fearsome prospect than being forced to disgorge all of what one actually
has received. This brings into better perspective the importance Congress has given to the
integrity of the registration scheme.
151 ' 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).
"' See Pinter v. Dahl. 486 U.S. 622. 641 n.18 (1988) ("Thiel damages calculation [of
section 121 results ill what is the substantial equivalent of rescission.''): see also Randall v.
Imlisgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 656 (1986) (same general effect).
1 ' 2 The term "prospectus" is defined in section 2(10) of the '33 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10)
(1988).
' 53 In the case of section 12(2), courts have regarded the purchaser's lack of knowledge
as an element of the plaintiff's case. See. e.g., Wigand v. Flo-Tek, Inc.. 609 F.2d 1028, 1034
(2d Cir. 1979); Johns Hopkins Univ. V. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied. 416 U.S. 916 (1974). See slippy note 139 for a discussion of the genesis of the knowing
plaintiff concept.
' 3 ' Pin /er, 486 U.S. at 655.
'" As We Supreme Clturf noted in Pinter, the "offers or sells" and "purchasing such
security from him" language governing section 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988), has an
identical counterpart in section 12(2). 486 U.S. at 655. Accordingly, most courts and com-
mentators have used the same definition of potential defendants for purposes of both
subsections. See, e.g.. Pharo v. Smith. 621 F.2d 656, 665-68. and nn.6-8 (5th Cir. 1980);
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Court recently defined this group as those composed of the previous
owner of the security (that is, the individual passing title to the
plaintiff) and anyone who solicited the sale in question to further
either his or her own, or the seller's, financial interest. 156 The use
of this fairly narrow definition effectively imposes on the plaintiff
a type of privity requirement.'''
Although reliance is not required by the language of section
12(2), 158 at least one commentator has suggested that the cause of
action sounds in fraud, thus mandating proof of reliance.'''' None-
theless, substantial authority exists that purchasers seeking rescis-
sion under section 12(2) need not demonstrate reliance.' 6" In fact,
where the misrepresentation or omission is contained in a writing
and relates to a widely held security, purchasers apparently need
not even demonstrate their receipt of the misleading writing.'"
Schneider, Section 12 of The Securities Act of 1933: The Privity Requirement in the Contemporary
Securities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L. REV. 235, 261 & no.144 & 145 (1984).
15" Pinter, 486 U.S. at 643. Fur a discussion of the controversy surrounding this issue
prior to Pinter ., see O'Hara Erosion of the Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act
41933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 UCLA L. REV. 921 (1984).
155 "Privit y of contract" is defined as "Itlhat connection or relationship which exists
between two Or more contracting pinks. It was traditionally essential to the maintenance of
an action on any contract that there should subsist such privity between the plaintiff and
defendant in respect of the matter sued on." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1079 (5th ed. 1979).
See generally O'Hara, supra note 156.
The statute specifies only that the plaintiff must not have known of the misrepresen-
tation or omission. See supra note 150.
See T. F1AZI,N, SUpra note 8, § 7.5. at 204 An attempt might be made to justify this
inquiry by reference to the statutory requirement that the sale of the securities in question
be "by means of" the communication of which the plaintiff complains. See supra note 150
and infra text accompanying note 161, Douglas & Bates, 31(PM note 143, at 178 n.18. This
language occasionally has been said to impose the requirement (Si some sort of causal
relationship between communication and purchase. See, e.g., Austin v. Loltsgaarden, 675
F.2d 168, 176 (8th Cir. 1982), aft W, 478 U.S. 647 (1986).
I" Seer e.g., Wigand v. Elo-Tek, Inc., 609 F.2d 1028, 1034 (2(1 Cir. 1979); Alton Box
Board CO. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 1977); Hill York Corp. v,
American Intl Franchises, Inc., 4411 F.2d 680, 696 (5th Cir. 1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d
348, 3511-57 (10th Cir. 1970); John Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129-30 (4th
Cir. 1970); see also Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How it
Compares with Rule 105-5, 13 Hops. L. Rev. 231, 264-65 (1976).
wl See. e.g., Sanders v. John Noveen & Co., 619 E.2d 1222, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied. 450 U.S. 1005 (1981); De,tnnco V. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 840-42 (2d Cir. 1968).
This result is confirmed by a relevant Ilimse Report:
[A]Ithough [statements issued in connection with the sale of securities] may
- never actually have been seen by the prospective pnrchaser, bemuse of their
wide dissemination, [they] determine the market price of the security which in
the lass analysis reflects those manifold causes that are the impelling motive of
the particular purchase. The connection between the statements made and the
put-chase o1'l he security is cleat', :111(1, For this reason, it is the essence of fairness
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The Supreme Court specifically discussed the extent of the
rescissory remedy available under section 12(2) in the 1986 case of
Randall v. Loftsgaarden.'"2 In repulsing a claim that the amount
recoverable should be limited by any tax benefits received from
ownership of the relevant security, the Randall Court noted that in
enacting the '33 Act, Congress had broader goals than the reim-
bursement of particular victims. 63 Accordingly, the section 12(2)
defendant is to bear "the risk of an intervening decline in the value
of the security ... whether or not that decline was actually caused by the
fraud."'" The Court noted that Congress devised this risk to create
an additional measure of deterrence as compared to a purely com-
pensatory measure of damages.'"
b. Summary of Causal Elements
Section 12(2) plaintiffs must plead that they did not know of
the true state of affairs concealed by the misrepresentations or
to insist upon the assumption of responsibility for the making of these state-
ments.
11.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10. reprinted in 1933 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. News
(referring to sections 11 and 12 of the '33 Act). See geneodly Landis, The Legislative Hisnny of
the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WAsn. L. REV. 29 (1959).
Although the causal elements of a suit based on a misrepresentation or omission relating
to a security that is not widely held basically track those described in the text, there is one
arguable difference. This inv()Ives receipt of the coininunicarion that is claimed to be deice-
tive..1-hus, if a misrepresentation is made only to the first of two individual purchasers, and
is not communicated to the second, it appears that the sale to the second purchaser does not
satisfy the "by means of" requirement imposed by the statutory language. See supra note 153.
In effect, both transaction and loss causation clearly are lacking in these circumstances. In
still other terms, the conclusion that the seller should have no liability to the second purchaser
makes sense because the defendant has created a risk of injury only to the first, and thus
has breached no duty to the second. The threatened penalty might be excessive if the rule
were otherwise. Sloreover, once having misspoken, the seller would have little reason not to
repeat the misrepresentation to subsequent purchasers.
"12 478 U.S. 647, 655-60 (1983).
Id. at 659.
Id. (emphasis added).
/d. A defendant under section 12(2) can, however, escape liability entirely by "sus-
tainting] the burden of proof that he (lid not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care
could not have known, of such untruth or omission." 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). This standard
"presumably is somewhat less exacting" than the reasonable investigation standard of section
II. Douglas & Bates, supra note 143, at 208 n.205: Comment, "Reasonable Care" in Section
12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.48 U. Cm. L. REV. 372, 387-92 (1981). For suggestions that
the standards are similar or that the standard enunciated by section 12(2) is the stricter, see,
respectively, Folk, supra DOW 133, at 207-15, and Kaminsky, sups'« note 160, at 275-78. Its
addition, die section 12(2) cause ()I' action is subject to the same short statute of !imitations
ai)plicable to actions brought under section II. See supra note 138.
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omissions on which suits are based. 66 Nonetheless, exclusion of
those who knew of the misrepresented or omitted matter from the
class of plaintiffs does not establish serious interest in cause.' 67 After
all, where the misrepresentation or omission is addressed either
directly to the plaintiffs or to a public market in which the security
in question is traded, there most likely will be no inquiry into
transaction causation.'" Similarly, no opportunity arises for the
defendant to raise the subject of loss causation. If the misrepresen-
tation or omission was made, and the plaintiffs did not know the
truth, defendants in privity (as defined above) will be liable for
rescission or rescissory damages,"" broadly calculated in light of
Randall v. Lofisgaarden.'m
From the face of section 12(2), it appears, then, that Congress
hoped to impose fairly certain liability on those defendants who
financially benefit from transactions involving misrepresentations
or omissionsin In such circumstances, it is the rescission measure,
along with the modified privity requirement, that brings such lia-
bility within reasonable limits. 172 The fact that loss causation is never
permitted to be raised as an issue makes it even clearer than in the
I"" See supra !tole 153 and accoinpanying text; see also, e.g., Mayer v. Oil Fiehl Systems
Corp., 803 F.2d 749, 755 (2d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff who knew of i he matter omitted cannot
recover under section 12(2)).
" 57 See supra note 139 Mr a description of the genesis of the "knowing plaintiff . " concept
at a time when section 12 had not been separated from scoioll 11 and their common
predecessor (draft section 9) contemplated suits against "vendors."
From the strict economic viewpoint, it would seem that the willingness of an individual
to purchase in the face of actual knowledge reflects a conscious assumption of risk for which
a price concession could be demanded. If such a demand is not made, the purchaser
presumably has some reason. Thus, theta: is no coerced transfer or wealth. Moreover, assum-
ing that the knowledge of the purchaser is incidental and not foreseen by the seller making
a misrepresentation, deterrence values would not seem to require imposition of liability. In
other words, the happenstance of the knowing purchaser and resultant nonliability is suffi-
ciently unlikely that it wind(' not affect the seller's planning. Nonetheless, because there is
apt to be a shot-thin in detecting activities involving concealment, imposition of liability in
this situation is justifiable. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
1 "" See supra note 160. In these circumstances, no sound reason exists to distinguish oral
and written communications, assuming that the communication in question is addressed to
the market.
to This assumes, of course, that other applicable defenses, such as reasonable care, are
unavailable. See supra Julie 165.
17" See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 270-84 and
accompanying text for discussion of rescissory damages in the rule 101-5 context.
m This again assumes that the defendants in question are unable to demonstrate their
reasonable care. See O'Hara, supra note 156, at 973, 1001-02.
175 "I'lliS function, then, parallels that of the tracing and other requirements under
section 11. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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case of section 11 that the cause of action is not primarily compen-
satory.'" Thus, deterrence is the logical, and acknowledged,'"
congressional goal; its method of accomplishment is imposition of
a penalty that sometimes theoretically will Nita!'" but sometimes
will exceed' 7" the defendant's gain from any misrepresentation."
This amount.'" is to be collected by a private attorney general who,
not coincidentally, also happens to be the individual most likely to
have suffered any injury the defendant's wrongful act may have
caused.
3. Section 18(a) of the '34 Act
a. Generally
Under section 18(a) of the '34 Act,' persons purchasing or
selling securities at a "price affected" by a false or misleading
statement's" contained in a document filed with the SEC under the
' 77 But see Douglas & Rates, supra note 143, at 177 ( —The remedy under section 12(2)
.. is probably compensatory.•).
' 71 See supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
175 This would be the case where the plaintiff seeks rescission and returns to the
defendant a security with all residual value taller than that attributable to the misrepresen-
tation.
17" This would be the case where, for instance, there has been an interim decline in the
value of the security not attributable to the misrepresentation.
177 Where a defendant seller's gain will include some profit not related to the misrepre-
sentation, e.g., sonic previously accumulated increase in value, this amount may be returned -
to the defendant upon rescission or accounted for in calculating rescissory damages. But see
supra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
17" See supra text accompanying notes 87-88 and supra MAC 177 for a discussion of the
economic desirability of this measure.
9" Section 18(a), in relevant part. reads as follows:
Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any appli-
cation, report, or document filed pursuant to this title or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as pro-
vided in subsection (d) of section 15 of this title, which statement was at the
time and in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or
misleading with respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not
knowing that such statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such
statement, shall have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by
such statement, fir damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall
prove that he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false or misleading.
15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
18" Although, as proposed, the section specifically referred to omissions, this reference
was deleted in conference as surplusage in view of the fact that a statement obviously may
be misleading because of a material omission." H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 36,
reprinted in 1934 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS.
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'34 Act may recover for damages caused by their reliance. In con-
trast 10 the express rights granted under the '33 Act, the reliance
requirements under section 18 are quite strict. In fact, courts typi-
cally require satisfaction of the "eyeball test"—the party seeking
recovery must demonstrate that he or she actually read either the
original or a copy of the filed document.'" As commentators have
noted, however, few panicipants in modern securities markets
themselves read filings with the SEC; they instead rely either on
information disseminated by professional analysts (who may or may
not themselves become purchasers or sellers) or simply on market
movements. 82 Accordingly, actions under section 18(a) are scarce,
and in no reported case has the plaintiff obtained a recovery.'"
The utility of such actions is even further reduced due to the
strict causal showing thought to be required by the statute's "price
affected" wording.'" Courts have construed this wording as placing
a burden on the plaintiff' to demonstrate a causal connection be-
tween the misrepresentation or omission in question and the secu-
rity's movement in price.'"
Persons who may be sued under section I8(a) include the issuer
or other person filing the document, as well as "any person who
shall make or cause to be made" the relevant misrepresentation or
omission.)8t' This language indicates that liability may be imposed
on any of the issuer's officers or directors who sign the filed docu-
ments,'87 and may extend to other officers and directors as well.
", See, e.g., Ross v. A. H. Robins Co.. 607 E2d 545, 552 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 946 (1980); Hen v. Weitzel], 402 F.2d 909, 916 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903
(1969); Jacobson v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 445 F. Supp. 518, 525 (S.D.N.V. 1977).
182 See Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 Hmtv. L. REV. 1340, 1359-60 (1966);
Noe, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Putting the Bile Bach into the Toothless
Tiger, 47 FORDI IAM L. REV. 115, 116 (1978).
1" See NI. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES 5.04121
(1988); Steinberg, The Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies. Under The Federal Securities
Laws. 67 CORNELL L. REV. 557, 579-80 (1982).
I" See supra note 179.
See Hoover v. Allen, 241 F. Stipp. 213, 223-25 (S.D.N.V. 1965); cf. Chemetron Corp.
v. Business Funds, Inc., 682 E2d 1149, 1157 (5th Cir. 1982) (same question in context of
section 9(e) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C.* 78i(e) (1988)).
"" See supra note 179.
The iliijsosinon of liability upon signatories is particularly important now that a
majority of the board of directors is required to sign the issuer's Annual Report on Form
10— K. See General Instruction D(2)(a) to Form 10 —K. SEC Securities Act Release No. 6231, Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 569, at SS-3 (Sept. 10. 1980); see also M. Steinberg, supra note
183.* 5.04[3].
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There is no requirement that the plaintiff have had any transaction
with the issuer or other defendant.' 88
b. Sumtnaty of Causal Elements
Suits under section 18(a) are subject to causal demonstrations
at least as strict as those typically , required at common law.' 89 In
contrast to sections 11 and 12(2), both a type of transaction causa-
tion and loss causation are made elements of the plaintiff's case.
This variation in rigor suggests at least two possible conclusions.
The first is that because there is no requirement of privity or other
ready method of capping potential liability, cause simply may be
intended to play a role in bringing potential liability within accept-
able bounds." If such limits were not in place, issuers might be
subject to overdeterrence in registering securities under the '34 Act
and making disclosure in the required reports. One way in which
this overdeterrence might be manifested is excessive caution and
expenditure in preparing filings.
A second possible conclusion is that section 18(a) suits are not
particularly favored relative to the '33 Act private rights,'"' and
were designed solely to recognize the plaintiff's moral claim to
compensation. Such an explanation is plausible if one believes either
that truth in distributing securities (addressed by section 11 and
section 12(2)) is more important than truth in the documents in-
tended to support the after-market'" 2 or that there is substantially
'" Available defenses include the defendant's proof that "he acted in good faith and
had no knowledge that such statement was false Or misleading." See supra note 179. This
formulation presumably contemplates a lesser standard than either t he "due diligence"
defense of section II or the "reasonable care" defense of section 12(2). See supra notes 133
and 165. Moreover, actions under section I8(a), like those under sections I I and 12(2), are
subject to a short statute of limitations: Section 18(c) pr ovides that suit must be brought
within one year of discovery of the relevant facts and within three years of the accrual of
the cause of action. 15 U.S.C. S 78r(c) (1988). AM/Eller important procedural limitation is
that a court in its discretion may award both court costs and attorneys' fees against either
party. Id. § 78r(a).
"" See generally Part IIA above.
19" As initially introduced, section I8(a) (then section 17(a)) contained a damage tneasure
that . could have led to fairly extensive levels of liability. This measure was the difference
between the price paid by the plaintiff and the lowest market price within 90 days of the
purchase. S. 2693, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 17(a) (1934).
11 This conclusion also might be suggested by the relatively lower standard of care
required to establish a defense mule!' section 18(a). See supra note 179.
102 A related explanation couched in economic terms is that any loss to traders caused
by defective '34 Act filings will be offset by gains to other traders. In other words, no serious
misallocation problems will result. Net societal losses presumably will be limited to the
mechanical making of the misrepresentation and the duplicative search costs stimulated if
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more incentive for sellers to mislead purchasers than for issuers
and their agents to misinform the market generally.
In evaluating these arguments, however, it should be noted that
section 12(2) literally does apply in after-markets as well as in dis-
tributions.'" Moreover, the adoption of the '34 Act itself stands as
recognition that capital formation and investor confidence goals
could not be attained without a safe after-market.' 94 Thus, the
argument based on concern with type of market is not particularly
strong.
The argument based on incentive to mislead may be more
attractive but also is ultimately unsatisfactory. In fact, there are
significant incentives for issuers to mislead the market.'" The dif-
ference between such incentives for issuers and those for sellers
cannot account for the vast difference in strength between the '33
Act rights and the right provided under section 18(a). The most
logical explanation, then, is that Congress simply felt a need to cap
liability in the section 18(a) context and resorted to the common
law concept of cause to do so.
In retrospect, however, the selection of common law cause
clearly was ill-suited to the open-market trading injuries that Con-
investors perceive that issuers and their agents may successfully misinform the market. This
arguably is a matter of less concern than the misallocation of capital that may he induced
where misrepresentation occurs in the initial sale of a security. It is possible, however, that
inaccurate aftermarket prices may affect the price of future initial offerings and the willing-
ness of lenders to make capital available.
"'" This is true despite the emphasis of '33 Act regulation on the initial placement
process. (11, United States v. Naftalis, 441 U.S. 768, 777-78 (1979) (viewing application
section 17(a) of the '33 Act to the after market as a "nunor departure" From the '33 Act's
primary concern "with the regulation of new offerings"). A few lower courts, in disregard
of the language of the statute, have declined to apply section 12(2) to the alter market. See,
e.g., Strong v. Paine Webber, Inc.,11988-89 Transfer Binder) (CCH) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1194,
053 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Ralph v. Prudential-Bache Secinli ics, Inc., 11988-89 Transfer Binder]
(CCM) Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 11 93, 964 (S.D. Fla. 1988); see also N. Steinberg, supra note 183,
§ 6.02111. The Supreme Conn, however, has not squarely 'addressed this issue. Compare Ernst
& Ernst v. flochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 209 n.27 (1976) (suggesting section 12(2) may not be
limited to distribution process), with Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723,
728, 753 (1975) (suggesting purchaser's right to sue under section 12(2) may he limited to
context of initial distribution).
See SUP/TI not e I 16 and accompanying text.
1 "" Consider, for instance, the incentive f]»r management to deny untruthfully the
existence of preliminary merger negotiations. See, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
227-28 (1988); Greenfield v. Fleoblein, Inc., 742 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1215 (1985). Consider also the facts of the landmark case SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cin 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas Gu/f
Sulphur Co., the issuer sought to maintain the secrecy of a major mineral discovery in order
to protect the, ability to acquire surrounding mineral-bearing properties and later issued a
misleading press release intended to quell a disorderly market. Id. at 843-47.
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gress intended section 18(a) to redress. It was an "overkill" response
to the need to limit the defendant's liability. Given that no plaintiff
has recovered under section 18(a), the section 18(a) cause of action
apparently has minimal deterrent or other effect. In effect, section
18(a) has been a failure.
4. Section 29(b) of the '34 Act
Although section 29(b) of the '34 Act' 96 does not confer a
private right of action as explicitly as the provisions previously
discussed, courts have reasoned that Congress clearly intended that
such a private right exists. Because section 29(b) provides that trans-
actions entered into in violation of the '34 Act, or otherwise involv-
ing such a violation, shall be void as to the violators, courts have
concluded that the power to avoid must lie in the hands of the
wronged parties. 197 Were this not the case, and were the power to
avoid in the hands of the SEC, such transactions presumably would
have been labeled void in their entirety, not merely as to the wrong-
doers. 198
Despite the federal courts' relatively uniform conclusion that
section 29(b) does confer a private right, intrajudicial dispute has
arisen about the extent of such right. Some courts construe the
section literally as granting an innocent party the right to avoid,
1 " Section 29(b) provides, in relevant part, as Follows:
Every contract made in violation of any provision of this title or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, and every contract (including any contract for listing a
security on an exchange) heretofore or hereafter made the performance of
which involves the violation of or the continuance of any relationship or practice
in violation of, any provision of this title or any rule or regulation thereunder,
shall be void (I) as regards the rights of any person who, in violation of any
such provision, rule or regulation, shall have made or engaged in the perfor-
mance of any person who, not being a party to such contract, shall have acquired
any right thereunder with actual knowledge of the facts by reason of which the
making or performance of such contract was in violation of any such provision,
rule, or regulation ....
15 U.S.G. § 78cc(b) (1988).
117 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 735 (1975); Mills v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 387 (1970); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins.
Co., 499 E2d 715, 726 (8th Cir. 1977). According to the Mills Court, "[Ole interests of the
victim are sufficiently protected by giving him the right to rescind; to regard the contract as
void where he has not invoked that right would only create the possibility of hardships to
him or others without necessarily advancing the statutory policy of disclosure." 396 U.S. at
388.
'"" See supra note 197 For the cited authorities; see also Gruenhaum & Steinberg, Section
29(h) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Viable Remedy Awakened, 48 Gat. WASII. L. REV.
1, 9 (1989).
September 1990] CAUSATION, COURTS, AND CONGRESS 	 1065
and thus to rescind, any contract involving another party's violation
of the '34 Act. '99 Others regard this construction as "Draconian ,"200
and contend that section 29(b) is interpreted more properly as
incorporating state common law regarding illegal contracts.20' Com-
mentators have strenuously criticized this latter view on the grounds
that it disregards the clear language and meaning of the statute and
that "[Of [the] consequences are too harsh on any party, the legis-
lature, not the courts, must change the statute."202
Under either view, courts apparently require a showing of priv-
ity between violator and innocent party before granting a remedy."'
They do not strictly require, however, an injury to the innocent
party or, indeed, any particular consequence of the violation in
question.2'4 Nonetheless, courts regard whatever remedy is available
as equitable in nature,2°5 and therefore, without any prompting
from the statute, may make equitable adjustments in the recovery
109 See, e.g., Eastside Church of Christ v. National Plan, Inc., 391.F.2d 357, 362 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 913 (1968); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 742 (8th Cir. 19(17), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Marrero v. Banco di Roma (Chicago), 487 F. Stapp. 568, 578
(ED. La. 1980).
Pear!stein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1149 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting), ant denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971); see Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan &
Assoc., 496 E2d 1255, 1265 (4th Cir.) (using the term "devastating"), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1023 (1974).
2"1 E.g., Occidental Lift. 496 F.2d at 1255-6(3: PearIstein, 429 Eal at 1149 (Friendly, J.,
dissenting); Gannett Co. v. Register Publishing Co., 428 F. Stipp. 818, 831 (D. Conn. 1977);
Freeman v. Marine Midland Bank—New York, 419 F. Supp. 440, 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
Under this approach, a decision that a contract is It on presumably would require an assess-
ment of such factors as seriousness of the particular wrongdoing and the public policies
implicated by the particular case. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon
County Coal Co., 799 E.2d 265, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS
§ 178 (1979).
202 Gruenbaum & Steinberg. supra note 198, at 17; see also Blue Chip Statnps v. IMItnor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748 (1975).
2"" See, e.g., Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 E.2d 577, 590 (3d Cir. 1975); Eastside Church,
391' F.2d at 363; Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 E2d 783, 792 (8th Cir. 1967). The
CO ncept to a)' be expanded where the complaining party has acquired rights as an assignee,
see, e.g., Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 499 F.2d 715, 726 (8th Cir. 1974),
reel. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975), or third-party beneficiary, see 3 L. Loss, supra tune II, at
1759, or where the cornplaining party is suing derivatively, see, e.g., Slavin v. Germantown
Fire Ins. Co., 174 E2d 799, 805-06 (3d Cir. 1949); Kaminsky v. Abrams, 281 F. Supp. 501,
507 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). But Ace (Tanenbaum & Steinberg, supra note 198, at 33-34, for an
argument that the privity requirement should be followed only when application furthers
the purposes of the '34 Act.
Regional Properties, Inc. v. Financial & Real Estate Consulting Co., 678 E2d 522,
559 (5th Cir. 1982). This is similar to the comnion law or equitable action or rescission,
which does not require any showing of damage. See, e.g., L. Loss, supra note 103, at 873,
941; see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § I, C0111111CID e (1936).
205 See, e.g., Occidental Lift, 496 F.2d at 1265-613; Freeman, 419 E. Stipp. at 453.
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ultimately granted. 20" These adjustments could mean that the res-
cissory damages actually awarded will equal compensatory damages
in some circumstances. 207 The propensity to make such adjustments,
however, should be reduced by the Supreme Court's recognition in
Randall v. Lafisgaarden208 that rescissory remedies legitimately may
exceed the plaintiff's loss in order to serve a deterrent function. 209
In summary, although privity apparently is regarded as an
element of section 29(b), cause is not. Section 29(b) thus poses a
ready analogue to section 12(2), discussed above."'" Its causal ele-
ments therefore need not be separately addressed.
5. Summary of the Express Private Rights for Misrepresentation
A pattern present in both the '33 and '34 Acts thus begins to
emerge. Generally, plaintiffs in some forms of privity may rescind,
without causal showing, those transactions involving the defendants'
violation of one of the federal securities acts. In addition, certain
causes of action exist without reference to privity but with differing
causal requirements. The use of varying formulations strongly sug-
gests that the drafters assigned no intrinsic value to causal linkage.'"
Attempted explanations based on such factors as respect for defen-
dant autonomy and retribution thus have no particular utility.
Rather, the simple fact that these variations exist indicates that
where any form of causation is invoked, it is a means to an end.
The most plausible end appears to be imposition of manageable
limits on potential liability.
2thi Thus, for instance, a court might not regard it as equitable to grant restitution when
the security has suffered a severe depreciation in market value. See RESTATEMENT (Jr RESTI-
TuTioN §§ 69,142, especially the caveats and comment c (1936).
217 for instance, this might occur where hedging transactions are possible. See Easter-
brook & Fischel, ,supra note 85, at 637-38; see also infra notes 278-84 and accompanying
discussion for the calculation of rescissory damages in actions brought tinder rule 101)-5 and
the description of other restrictions that stay he placed on a plaintiff's ability to rescind.
28" See supra mites 162-65 and accompanying text for a description of Randall in the
section 12(2) context.
'ft ' in fact, the Supreme Court specifically contemplated rescission in the '34 Act context,
rejecting an argument that if a rescissory remedy is available under section 10(b) it slamld
be limited by section 28(a)'s statement that plaintiffs under the '34 Act may receive only
"actual damages." 478 U.S. 647,660 (1986).
11 " See supra text accompanying notes 166-78.
'2 " The use of varying conduct-related defenses may or may tint suggest the same thing.
These differences presently are toil understood well enough to be an especially fruitful line
of inquiry. Nonetheless, it seems that defendant behavior is more intrinsically nteaningful
than is the requirement of cause. See generally supra Part I IA.
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More specifically, the express private rights of action for mis-
representation provided by the federal securities acts have impor-
tant similarities, but also critical differences. These similarities and
differences suggest the outline of a coherent scheme for private
enforcement and reimbursement of injury ? '" One rendition of such
an outline appears immediately below.
6. Models Based on Types of Presumed Injuries
One generally can describe the shape of misrepresentation rem-
edies discussed thus far in terms of two different types of injury
presumed to occur in particular trading contexts. These two types
may be characterized by reference to the causal relationships dis-
cussed in Part IIA of this article. The variety of such relationships
demonstrates, however,'" that causal linkages were not of particular
interest to Congress but instead were means to ends.
a. The Face - to-Face Model—Transaction. Causation
The two explicit private rights most often applicable in the case
of misrepresentation or omission in face-to-face settings 211 are sec-
tion 12(2) of the '33 Act and section 29(b) of the '34 Act. The
intimacy of the context is more or less assured by applicable privity
requirements. The granting by each of these sections of a rescission-
based remedy has the effect of presuming that the defendant lured
the plaintiff into a transaction that would not have taken place at
any price had the plaintiff known the truth. In other words, the
defendant's act of misrepresentation or omission is treated as the
cause of the transaction, and the fact of the transaction is regarded
as the plaintiff's redressable injury.
212 Some commentators might challenge any claim of a oudine. According to
Professor Loss, "Itlhe inevitable result of this episodic, kind of legislation, enacted often in
response to crisis, is a great many inconsistencies, a considerable number of both gaps and
overlaps, and in general needless complexity in a field of the law that would not make light
bedtime reading at best." L. Loss. supra note 103, at '38-39. Nonetheless, to the extent that
one can either identify or superimpose coherence and consistency, it would seem prudent
not to ignore the opportunity to do so.
20 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
2 " Note that a face-to-face context does not necessarily imply that the transaction would
have qualified as a private placement, exempt from the '33 Act's registration requirements
by reason of section 4(2). 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
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b. The Open-Market Model—Transaction Price Causation
Section 11 of the '33 Act and section 18(a) of the '34 Act are
the provisions most likely to be invoked in connection with trading
in the open market. These two provisions either invite or demand
focus on the issue of loss causation. This focus suggests that a
transaction in the security in question would have taken place at
some price, even had the truth been known. 215
It is crucial to note, however, that although injuries redressable
under section 18(a) seem to be regarded as a function of the cau-
sation of transaction price, nothing is presumed about the causal
linkage itself. Both transaction and loss causation are made elements
of the plaintiff's case. In contrast, plaintiffs suing under section 11
who acquired their securities before the release of the issuer's
twelve-month earnings statement are granted an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of transaction causation and, in effect, a rebuttable pre-
sumption of loss causation. 2 '" This distinction evidently is based on
the fact that there is a tracing requirement and a limit on total
damages under section 11; section 18(a) provides no theoretical
equivalents. Nonetheless, in light of section 1800's failure as a viable
remedy, it appears that the section 11 approach to cause must
provide the preferred model, presumably accompanied by recog-
nition that additional forms of limitation on liability may be appro-
priate in some circumstances.
B. Implied Rights
1. Rule 1013-5 Under the '34 Act
a. Generally
The implied rights arising under the regulations to rule 10b-
5,217 -which Congress promulgated pursuant to section I 0(b) of the
215 This treatment often is justified by reasoning that the plaintiffs have shown them-
selves willing to invest on the open market. Even had they not purchased the security in
question, they might have purchased some other publicly traded security, thereby willingly
exposing themselves to general market forces and, quite possibly, industry-specific swings as
well. This will not, however, inevitably be the case. See.Coffee, supra note 85, at 748-49 for
an insightful discussion of motives for holding nondiversified securities portfolios and other
reasons for investment, including employee loyalty.
256 See supra notes 192-95 for a discussion of arguments concerning the possible reasons
for distinguishing distributions and tradings in the after-market.
217
	
C.F.R. § 240.106-5 (1987). The rule provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
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'34 Act,218 are by far the best known of the private rights of action
implied under the federal securities laws. 21 " A court recognized the
first such right in 1946, 220 during a time when private causes of
action were implied more readily than is the case today. 22 ' The
existence of this right now is "simply beyond peradventure. "222
The language of. rule 10b-5 broadly prohibits (1) employing
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) making an untrue
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a)m employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit us state a
material Fact necessary in order to make statentents made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
ptuthase or sale of any security.
284 15 U.S.C. 78j (1988).
219 Substantial dispute exists as to whether section 17(a) of the '33 Act gives rise to any
implied private rights of action. See generally T. Hazen, .supra note 8, § 13.13 & 1988 Supp.;
Scholl & Perkowski, An Implied Right of Action Under Section 17(a): The Supreme Court Has Said
"No," But Is Anybody Listening?, 36 U. M13:41 L. Rev. 41, 45-64 (1981); Steinberg, Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933 After Naflalin and Redington, 68 GEO. L.J. 163, 172-85 (1979).
Acceptance of ally implied private rights under section 17(a), however, seems to be on the
decline. See, e.g., In re Washington Public Power Supply System Securities Litigation, 823
17.2d 1349, 1354 (9th Cir. 1987); Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d :326,
328 (8th Cir. 1986); Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381, 389 (5th Cir.
1982); Frytnire v. Peat, Mat-wick, Mitchell & Co., 657 F. Supp. 889, 892-93 (N.D. III. 1987);
Leiter v. Kuntz, 655 F. Supp. 725 (I). Utah 1987). B u t see, e.g., Gaff v. FDIC, 814 F.2d 311,
319 (6th Cir. 1987); Newcotne v. Esrey, 659 E. Supp. 100, 102 (W.D. Va. 1987); Federal Say.
& Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Express, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 1331, 1344 (D.P.R.
1987). This decline parallels a general decline in implication of federal private rights. See
generally supm note 10 and infra note 221 for the cited authorities. Moreover, for purposes
relevant to this article, those courts that do recognize such rights apparently structure them
more or less along the lines of the rights implied under rule 1013-5. Accordingly, separate
discussion of section 17(a) will be omitted from the remainder of this article. Note, however,
that the apparent lack of a scienter requirement under section 17(a)(2) and (3) may suggest
a distinction regarding need to limit liability. See Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1980).
220 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
221 See generally Ashford, supra note 102; Schnieder, Implying Private Rights and Remedies
Under The Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. REV. 853, 863-96 (1984); Ratner, The Demise of the
Implied Private Right of Action in the Supreme Court, 11 18sT. SEC. REG. 289 (1980); McMahon
& Rodos, Judicial Implication of Private Causes of Action: Reappraisal and Retrenchment, 80 Dick.
L. REV. 167, 169-92 (1976); see also supra notes 102-103.
222 14erman & MacLean v. liuddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 381 (1983). The Supreme Court
first acknowledged the existence of a private right under rule 106-8 in Superintendent of
Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 409 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). For more complete discussion
or the evolution of private rights under rule 10b-5, see, e.g., Cobine, Elements of Liability and
Actual Damages in Rule lob-5 Actions, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 651, 654-55 (1972); Ruder, Civil
Liability Under Rule 10b-5: judicial Revision of the Legislative Intent?, 57 Nw. U.L. REV. 627,
629-42 (1963).
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statement of material fact or omitting a statement of material fact
necessary to render those statements that are made not misleading,
and (3) engaging in any act, practice, or course of business operating
as a fraud or deceit in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security.22" The rule's generality is quite deliberate, as it was adopted
as a catchall provision to cover acts and practices that Congress and
the SEC had failed to address more specifically:22' The Supreme
Court, however, has specified that rule 1 Ob-5 addresses only situ-
ations involving deceit or manipulation225 and has indicated that
manipulation should be understood to involve either misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure.225
There are certain other aspects of the private rights of action
under rule 1 Ob-5 with respect to which the Supreme Court has
acted definitively. The Court has established that private plaintiffs
must demonstrate both that they are either purchasers or sellers of
securities,227 and that the defendants acted with scienter.228 The
Supreme Court's adoption of this latter requirement arose in part
from the perceived need to avoid nullification of the procedural
requirements of the express private rights created by sections Ii
and 12(2) of the '33 Act.228 One factor, however, that private plain-
tiffs need not be concerned with is their privity with the defendants.
It is clear, for instance, that an issuer making public misrepresen-
228 See supra note 218.
224 See Remarks of Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws,
22 Bus. Lim 793, 922 (1967). Of an earlier version of what was to become section I00). an
administrative spokesperson stated, "litl says, -Thou shah not devise any other Cunning
devices.'" Stock Exchange Regulation, Hearings on II. R. 7852 Before the House Comm. on Intl and
For. Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Thomas G. Corcoran); see also
Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 382 (rule 106-5 is a catchall); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 234-35 (1980) (same).
226 See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-77 (1972).
2253 id.; see also Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. I, 7-8 (1985) ("manipulative"
as used in section I4(e) of the '34 Act, 15 US.C. § 78n(e) (1982), requires misrepresentation
or nondisclosure); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235 (limiting liability for nondisclosure to situations
where duty to disclose exists).
224 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975).
228 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1977); see also Aaron v. SEC,
446 U.S. 680, 695-96 (1980) (impoSing scienter requirement in SEC enforcement actions).
As recognized by the Supreme Court in these cases, scienter is, at least, a state of mind more
culpable than negligence. Lower federal courts have struggled with whether reckless conduct
by a defendant is sufficient to constitute scienter. See generally Metzger & Heintz, Hochfelder's
Progeny: Implications for the Auditor, 63 MINN. L. REV. 79, 90-112 (1978) (discussing the circuit
courts' attempts to define scienter after Hochfelder); Note, Recklessness Under Section 10(b):
Weathering the flochfelder Storm, 8 Rut-CAM: LW 325, 349-51 (1977) (examining post-Hod/-
fp/der judicial treatment of the recklessness standard).
229 Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 208-11.
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talons may be liable to persons purchasing or selling securities in
the after-market and having no transaction with the issuer what-
soever.""
There are a number of questions regarding private actions
under rule I Ob-5 that remain unsealed. Some of these arise in
connection with particular applications of the rule and are discussed
below. 23 ' Others are more general. For example, considerable at-
tention recently has focused on the statute of limitations applicable
for purposes of rule 1013-5. Despite a fairly long tradition of looking
to state law to resolve this issue, 232 a few recent cases have relied on
the statutes of limitation applying to analogous express rights ex-
isting under the federal securities law."' Accordingly, a distinct split
of authority on this issue now awaits eventual resolution by the
Supreme Court.
i. The Duty Not to Mislead
The language of rule l013-5(2) clearly imposes a duty to refrain
from making untrue statements of material fact and to disclose any
fact necessary to render a statement not misleading."' Quite simply,
2 , "; q:, e.g., Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988).
2" See infra text accompanying notes 256-61.
2" See, e.g., Hochfe(der, 425 U.S. al 2 ID n.29 (dictum): Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329,
1333 (7th Cir.), ctrl. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15, 17 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981); Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450, 452
(3d Cir. 1979); Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 614-15 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075 ( 1977); Premier Indus. v. Delaware Valley Fin. Corp., 185 F. Supp.
694, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1960). See generally L. Loss, supra note 103, at 993-96; Brodsky, Statutes
of Limitations, 12 REV. SEC. REG. 909 (1979); Martin, Statutes of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions:
Which State Statute is Applicable?. 29 BUS. LAW 443, 455 11.91 (1974); Schulman, Statutes of
Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confnsion, 13 1A'AvNE L. REV. 635, 638-43
(1967).
2 ' 1 " See, e.g., Hill v. Equitable Trust Co., 851 F.2d 691, 697-98 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 791 (1989); In re Data Access Systems Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537, 1545 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 109 S. Ct, 131 (1988); cf: Zigel v. Garcia, [1988-89 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 11 44,374 (D.C. Md. 1988) (alternative grounds for decision). See supra note
232 14 commentators' apinoval of the common sense and logic of this approadt.
Outside the securities context, the Supreme Court has indicated that state statutes of
limitation need not be "mechanically applied ... simply because a limitations period is absent
from the federal statute." Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977). In Occidental Lift, the Court stated that "lift is the duty of
the federal courts to assure that the importation of state law will not frustrate (Jr interfere
with the implementation of national policies." Id.: see also DelCostello v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters, 402 U.S. 151, 169-71 (1983); International Union, United Automobile
Workers of America v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 707 n.9 (1966); McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958).
254 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5(b) (1987). See supra note 218.
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if a disclosure is made, it must be both accurate and complete in all
material respects. Moreover, courts have held in certain circum-
stances that failure to speak where some duty exists to do so is
actionable, presumably under other parts of rule 10b-5. 235
Courts frequently assert that in a rule 10b-5 action based on
untrue statements, a private plaintiff must show that, in connection
with the purchase or sale of a security, the defendant (1) with
scienter, (2) made a false representation of (3) a material fact, (4)
upon which the plaintiff justifiably relied (5) to his or her detri-
ment. 28" Although not determinative, 237 the common law tort of
fraud has provided the basic model for the development of these
elements. 238
The elements of a cause of action premised on nondisclosure
roughly parallel those of an action based on an affirmative misre-
presentation. The most significant difference has been the result of
a Supreme Court pronouncement in 1972. In Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 23" the Court ruled that where circumstances pri-
marily involve a failure to disclose, "positive proof of reliance is not
a prerequisite to recovery." 24" The Court further noted that 141
that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense
that a reasonable investor might have considered them important
in the making of this decision. This obligation to disclose and this
withholding of a material fact establish the requisite element of
causation in fact." 24 ' There has been some dispute as to whether
this ruling encompasses all cases primarily involving nondisclosure
or is limited to circumstances, like those of Affiliated Ute, involving
" 5 This article refers to all of these requirements as We "duty not to mislead." Sec infra
notes 251-61 for a discussion of one specialized set of circumstances involving the duty to
disclose or refrain from trading.
23" See, e.g., Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977); Holdsworth v.
Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). Some
courts require that the plaintiff establish the justifiability of reliance as a separate element.
See, e.g.. Duptly, 551 E2c1 at 1014; cf. Paul E Newton Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank. 630
F.2(1 1111, 1121-22 (5th Cir. 1980).
237 See Note, supra note II, at 585 n.7 (quoting 3 L. Loss, supra note II, at 1435 to the
effect that "the fraud provisions in the SEC acts ... are not limited to circumstances which
would give rise to a common law action for deceit").
23" See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 744 (1975); Dupuy,
551 F.2d at 1018; List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Wheeler, supra note II, at 575; Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule
lOb-5, 32 U. Cut. L. REV. 824, 828-32 (1965).
2"" 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
241) Id. at 153-54.
" 1 Id.
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nondisclosure by a party upon whom the plaintiff generally re-
lied.242 The former interpretation, however, has been more popu-
lar243
The recent case of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson rectified some part of
the suggested schism between actions based on nondisclosure and
those based on affirmative misrepresentation.2" In Levinson, the
Supreme Court held that no error arose in the use of the "fraud-
on-the-market" theory.2" This holding established that the burden
of demonstrating reliance could be met (that is, that reliance could
be presumed) where the private plaintiff showed (1) that the defen-
dant made public misrepresentations, (2) that the misrepresenta-
tions would be material to a decision to purchase or sell the relevant
shares, (3) that the shares purchased or sold by the plaintiff were
traded on an efficient market,246 and (4) that the plaintiff traded
242 See Cavalier Carpets, Inc. v. Caylor, 746 F.2d 749, 756 (1101 Cir. 1984) (in order to
clahn the presumption, plaintiff must demonstrate general reliance); Simon v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner 8c Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1973) (same).
See, e.g.. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236
(2d Cir. 1974); Roche,. Bros. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. Fidelity
Bank, 365 F. Stipp. 1391, 1398 (EA/ Pa. 1973). For evidence of a related dispute, compare
Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 547-49 (5th Cir. 1981) (necessary to
characterize violation as primarily failure to disclose under rule 101)-5(1) or (3)), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, an at/iergronuds. 459 U.S. 375 (1983), with Holmes v. Bateson, 583 F.2d 542,
558 (1st Cir. 1978) (reliance may be presumed in Itall-truth case coming within rule 10b-
5(2)). For a discussion of these and other appnntches, see generally Note, Reliance, supra
note 11.
485 U.S. 224, 249-50 (1988).
2'15 For commentary on this theory, see, e.g., Black, Fraud on the Market: A Criticism of
Dispensing with Reliance Requirements in Certain Open Marker Transactions, 62 N.C.L. REV. 435,
447-57 (1984); Rapp, Rule 10b-5 and "Fraud-on-the-Marker—Heavy Seas Meet Tranquil Shares,
39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 861, 866-93 (1982); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV.
L. REV. 1143 (1982).
1 It The Supreme Court did not specify the indicia of an efficient market, other than to
say "modern securities inarkets . . . differ from the face to face transactions contemplated
by early fraud cases." 485 U.S. at 246. The Court further stated:
We need not determine by adjudicatkm what economists and sodal scientists
have debated through tlie use of sophisticated statistical analysis and the appli-
cation of CURIUM lc I II tory. For purposes of accepting the presumptkm of rdi-
ance in this case, we need only believe that niarket professionals generally
consider most publicly announced material statements about companies, thereby
affecting stock market prices.
Id. at 246-47 n.24.
Research conducted in support of the thesis that national securities exchanges dissemi-
nate information efficiently usually takes one or three forms. Fa ma, Efficient Capital Markets:
A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 253. FIN. 383, 388 (1970). "Weak form" tests measure
whether the market fnlly reflects historical price data. "Semi -strong Inrin" tests address
whether all publicly available in is reflected. "Strong form" tests examine whether
both public and nonpublic information are reflected. Tests of the strong Mimi theory have
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the shares between the time the misrepresentations were made and
the time the truth was revealed:247
Thus, at least in cases involving material misrepresentations
released to a public market trading in a particular security, courts
may afford private plaintiffs a rebuttable presumption of reliance
more or less equivalent to that generally regarded as available in
the case of material omissions. 2" Apparently, only in situations
involving affirmative misrepresentations relating to privately traded
securities will the court ritually put the plaintiff' to the proof of
reliance. 2" Nonetheless, even when relaxing the reliance require-
ment, the Supreme Court has been careful to observe that the
requirement has not been abandoned, and that causation-in-fact
continues to be a critical concept for purposes of rule I Ob-5 juris-
prudence. 251
ii. The Duty to Disclose or Refrain from Trading
Rule 106-5's prohibition of fraudulent or deceptive acts or
practices precludes certain parties from trading in given securities
while in possession of particular types of undisclosed material in-
formation relating to those securities. 251 The prohibition applies to
both the issuer of securities 252 and "insiders" of the issuer, 253 and
been inconclusive at best. See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate
Control, and the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 Tex. L. 1, 3 n.9 (1978). In fact, some
strong form tests suggest those with inside information trade at all advantage. See Seligman,
The Historical Need fin. a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 91 CORP. L. 1. 4 n.22 (1983).
212 485 U.S. at 248 n.27.
2" See L. Loss, supra note 103, at 962 ("As an alternative to reliance, the ['fraud on the
market') doctrine really adds nothing to Ute's presumption of reliance from materiality in
silence cases.").
"" In Basic, I ill:. v. Levinson, the Court (lid reaffirm the reliance requirement, saying.
1%0) agree that reliance is an element of a rule 101>-5 cause of action, Reliance provides the
requisite causal connection between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury.
There is. however, nuire than one way to demonstrate the causal connection." 495 U.S. at
243 (citations omitted).
21" Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 240.
151 See T. Hazen, supra note' 8, § 17.9; A. BROMBERG & D. LOWENCELS, SECURITIES FRAUD
& COMMODITIES FRAUD § 2.6(2) (1967).
151 See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.. 401 1 2.2(1 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
794 U.S. 976 (1969); accord Artier v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 418 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 830 (1974); Kohler v. Kohler Co.,. 719 F.2d 634, 638-39 (7th Cir. 1963);
Brudney, supra note 86, at 322.
1" SELIllty, supra lime 86, at 322. An insider is an individual owing a fiduciary duty' of
loyalty to an issuer's shareholders. Id. at 347-44. Subject to certain restrictions, individuals
who receive material, nonpublic information from insiders inherit a derivative dilly. See Dirks
v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 (1983).
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also may apply to others in the limited circumstances discussed
below. At a minimum, the information regarded as within the in-
terdiction includes those matters relevant to the intrinsic value of
the issuer's securities. 254 The duty imposed is an alternative one:
the individual or entity subject to the duty ("subject party") must
either disclose the relevant information to those with whom such
subject party will be trading or refrain from making a trade. 255
Courts readily have imposed the duty to disclose or refrain
from trading upon those individuals or entities who have a fiduciary
or similar relationship with parties with whom they seek to trade. 256
They have indicated only a limited willingness to extend the duty
beyond the traditional group of "insiders." Under a line of argu-
ment known as the "misappropriation theory," a person who has
misappropriated confidential information in violation of a fiduciary
duty owed to one other than the issuer or its shareholders also may
be included in the group of' subject parties. 25 ' To date, however,
the Supreme Court has failed to rule definitively on this theory, 258
even in the context of government enforcement. Moreover, lower
courts unanimously have declined to apply it in the context of
private rights of action. 259
751 Brodney, supra note 86, at 322. Such information is to be distinguished from that
relating to general market influences. See id. at 329.
2" Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 E2d at 848. But see Friedman, Efficient Market Themy and
Rule 1011-5 Non-Disclosure Claims: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REV. 745, 750 (1982)
(making the claim that abstention from trading is not an appropriate alternative). This article
will refer to this duty as the "duty to disclose or refrain from trading."
25" See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225-30 (1980). The initial appli-
cations or the duty to disclose or refrain from trailing were based on two rationales. First,
trading by insiders was a breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the issuer's sharelmlders (both
those purchasing and those selling shares). See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 &
11.15 (1961). Second, the use for private purposes of confidential information originally
intended for corporate purposes was inherently unfair to other investors. Id.
257 See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C4., dissenting); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1050-51 (6th ed. 1987).
25" See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (Court evenly split on the
validity of theory, at least on the facts presented). The Court has mentioned the theory at
least three other times without disapproving it See Bateman Fielder, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 313 11.22 (1985); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 665 (1983); Chiarella,
445 U.S. at 235-37.
259 See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 E.2d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1025 (1984). Note, however, that recent legislative history relating to a new, explicit private
right of action against inside traders has endorsed it wholeheartedly. See infra note 328 and
accompanying text. In addition, the theory has been approved by lower courts in cases
brought by the government. See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1029-34 (2d Cir.
1986), aff 'II by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 19 (1987); SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 201-
(13 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985); United States v. Newman, 664 E2d 12,
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In addition to the issues involved in defining the subject party,
more general questions have arisen regarding the circumstances in
which a violation of the duty will give rise to a private cause of
action. Most significantly, some courts have declined to permit per-
sons trading on a public market to pursue a remedy because they
were not able to demonstrate a causal connection between the in-
sider trading and either the fact.of their own market activity (i.e.
transaction causation) or the price at which it occurred (i.e. trans-
action price causation). 2"" Other courts, however, have indicated
that private plaintiffs need only establish that they traded contem-
poraneously with an insider in possession of undisclosed material
information, and "need not prove that [they] traded directly with
the defendant or that the volume of the defendant's trading some-
how induced [the plaintiffs'] trade[s]. "26'
iii. Damages and Rescission
Perhaps the most unsettled aspect of the various private rights
of action under rule 106-5 involves the calculation of damages . 262
Although there are a number of variant approaches, the primary
methods may be described generally as follows.
The most typical measure has been characterized as the "out-
of-pocket" measure. 263 In the case of a violation in connection with
the sale of a security, this measure reflects the difference between
the price the plaintiff paid for the security and the actual value of
what was received. In the case of a violation in connection with a
purchase, it represents the difference between the price the plaintiff
received and the actual value of what was sold. The measure at-
15-19 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 863 (1983); SEC v. Musells, 578 F. Supp. 425,
437-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). See generally Prentice, The Impact of Dirks on Outsider Trading, 13
Sec. R00. L.J. 38 (1985).
21" See, e.g., Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318-19 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429
U.S. 1053 (1977); ef. Dorfman v. First Boston Corp., 336 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (ED. Pa. 1974)
(failure to prove reliance).
2" 1 O'Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 800, 805 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); see also Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1068 (2d Cir. 1985); cf. In re Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., Exch. Act Rel. No. 34-21242 [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 9 83,656 (Aug. 15, 1984).
2"2 q Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 228 (1988) (Whited., dissenting) (discussing
the special difficulties of calculating rule 101)-5 damages in an action based on the fraud-on-
the-market theory).
2"3 Thompson, The Measure of Recovery Under Rule 106-5: A Restitution Alternative to Tort
Damages, 37 VAN!). L. REV. 349; 356 (1984); see also L. Loss, supra note 103, at 1133-34;
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (dicta).
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tempts to assess actual value on the clay the transaction complained
of occurred, and generally excludes future changes.264 This ap-
proach clearly has the effect of limiting liability by reference to the
notion of loss causation, and, at least in part, may be intended to
prohibit the plaintiff from shifting ordinary market risks to the
delendant.265 In some cases, however, the value of the security in
question at a date subsequent to the original transaction (often the
date on which the fact of the misrepresentation is disclosed publicly)
is used as the "best evidence" of what the security actually was worth
at the earlier time.26"
A second general approach to the measure of damages for
violations of rule I Ob-5 may be combined with the first approach.
Thus, a court may permit recovery of additional, "consequential"
damages where the plaintiff demonstrates the causal nexus with
some certainty.267 These damages might even include market losses
after the date of the transaction complained of if the plaintiff can
demonstrate that his or her decision to enter the market at all was
the "natural, proximate, and foreseeable consequence of defen-
dants' fraud."26" Similarly, where a defendant induces a plaintiff to
sell a security that otherwise would have been held throughout a
period of increasing market prices, the plaintiff may be entitled to
the difference between the sales price and the value of the security
as of some later date.26"
Based on the foregoing, courts commonly are quite interested
in limiting a plaintiff to compensatory damages. On fairly rare
occasions, however, they have been relatively more interested in
ensuring that a defendant does not benefit from his or her wrong-
2" Thompson, supra note 263, at 357.
201 Id. at 357-58; see also, e.g.. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 555
(5th Cir. 1981), aft' 'd in hart and mid in tart, 459 U.S. 375 (1983); Note, The Measure of
Damages in Rule 105-5 Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 26 STAN, L. REV. 371, 371-77
(1974).
2"" TIMMI)S011, 3 OM In ne 263, at 362-63. In still other cases, courts seek to ascertain
the value of the security at some reasonable time after the plaintiff's discovery of the
misrepresenuttion, apparently as a ineans of shifting to the defendant market losses incurred
before that point. See id. at 364-65. This determination has the effect Of partially overcoming
the potential unfairness of assuming that a plaintiff will quickly leant of, and respond to,
inforthation about prior misrepresentation.
267 Id. at 360-61; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 549(2) (1964).
26' See Garnatz v. Stile', Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978); see also Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1173 (2d Cir.
1970).
20) See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 17.2d 1005, 1024-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Myzel v, Field, 386 F.2d 718, 744-45 n.23 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
1078
	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 31:1027
doing."" This has sometimes been the case where the act com-
plained of is a violation of the duty to disclose or refrain from
trading. In this situation, the plaintiff may be unable to demonstrate
a causal connection between the defendant's violation and any in-
jury the plaintiff has suffered."' Where recovery nonetheless is
allowed , 272 it most likely is premised on the amount of the defen-
dant's profit from his or her unlawful act."' This "unjust enrich-
ment" approach"' sometimes also is endorsed in other circum-
stances. 275
At least some of those courts selecting an "unjust enrichment"
measure of recovery make no significant attempt to articulate the
reason for their choice. 2Th Others may depend on the theory that a
rescissory action might be available under section 29(b) once viola-
27" See, e.g.. ,lanigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2(1 781, 786 (1st Cir.), CM. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965), cited approvingly in Affiliates! Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972)
(supporting the proposition that "where the defendant received more than the seller's actual
loss ... damages are the amount of the defendant's profit .... IT1he accepted rationale ...
is simply that lilt is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls
than to let the fraudulent party keep them"); see also Randall v. Lolisgaarden, 478 U.S. 647,
654 (1986) (quoting Affiliated Ute but declining to decide whether rescission is available under
rule 10-5).
2" Rut see Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fustier & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 235-
36 (2c1 Cir. 1974) (plaintiff's injury was said to be attributable to the defendant's failure to
speak).
2" See id.; see also sup-a note 261 and accompanying text.
17' e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Meyers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1980). See
generally Langevoort, Insider 'Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella Restatement. 70
CALIF. L. Rev. I, 19-38 (1982). This approach typically would require pro-ration of the
recovery among those trading contemporaneously with the defendant. See Karjala, Statutory
Reguthtion ()pushier Trading in Impersonal Markets, 1982 !Alice L.J. (527, 639-40 (1982).
271 See Thompson, supra mite 263, at 354, for a suggestion that this approacls shay be
based upon the principles of unjust enrichment, "often described under the heading of
restitution." See generally G. PALNIER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 1. 1, at I (1978).
275 See, e.g.. Thomas v. Duralite, 524 F.2d 577, 589 (3d Cir. 1975); teller v. Hogue Elec.
Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 802 n.10 (2d Cir.), cal denied, 414 U.S. 908 (1973); Janigan v.
Taylor, 344 KM 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See generally Thompson,
supra time 263.
2I" Thus, some courts simply state that a plaintiff suing u nder rule 10b-5 may seek
either rescission or damages. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack. 524 F.2d 891. 909 (9th. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); Crist v. United Underwriters. Ltd., 343 F.2d 902, 903-04
(10th Cir. 1965): Evian v. Connell,. 236 F.2d 447, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1956); Johns Hopkins
Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Stipp. 250, 262 (O. Md. 1971), aff'd in part and rro'd in part, 488 F.2d
912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974). Some courts even have stated-
incorrectly—that rescission and restitution is the usual remedy in an action under rule 101)–
5. See John R. Lewis, Inc. v. Newman. 446 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1971). Other courts have
suggested that rescission is not available if damages are. See Gilbert v. Meyer, 362 F. Supp.
168, 176-77 (S.D.N.V. 1973).
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tion of rule Ob-5 is established.'" Still others simply seem to use
unjust enrichment and compensatory measures interchangeably."'
A few courts may reflect this confusion when they apply what one
commentator has termed the "tort view of rescission." 228 These
courts invoke unjust enrichment terminology but refuse to place
the plaintiff in a better position than occupied before the transaction
was entered. 2" In some cases, this approach consciously may have
been based on the statement in section 28(a) of the '34 Act that
plaintiffs under that Act are limited to actual damages. The Su-
preme Court has rejected the use of section 2800 as a limit on
rescissory damages:2s ] however, and the "tort view of rescission"
thus may be expected to decline.
Nonetheless, other substantial impediments remain for plain-
tiffs who seek a rescission-based recovery under rule I Ob-5. For
instance, courts considering such recoveries often inquire into
whether the benefit received by the defendant was causally linked
to the offense of which the plaintiff complains. 282 Further, the plain-
tiff typically must file suit for rescission promptly after notice of the
relevant misrepresentation or omission. 287 Another frequent, but by
no means universal, limitation is imposition of a privity require-
ment. 284
2" See supra notes 196-209 and accompanying text; see also Merritt, supra note 11, at
474 n.14.
2" See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1215 n.15 (5th Cir. 1982) (consequential
damages theory used to affirm award district court had described as rescissory), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 920 (1983); see also Garnatz v. Stile!, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
2" MOT -HIM n, supra mite 263, at 37(1. •
28" See, e.g., Glick v. Campagna, 613 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir. 1979); .see also fluddlesum v.
Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534, 554 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing Green v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1355 (1976) (Sneed, concurring)) ("[Rescission's] purpose is to
return the defrauded purchaser to the status quo ante."); Garnatz, 559 F.2d at 1361; American
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Equitable Gen. Corp., 493 F. Supp. 721, 758-59, 766 (E.D. Va. 1980).
2" I Randall v. Loltsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 660 (1986). See supra notes 162-65 and 208-
09 and accompanying text.
282 See, e.g., SEC v. Wills, 472 F. Supp. 1250, 1263 (D.D.C. 1978); see also SEC v. Galaxy
Foods, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1246 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aft 'd, 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 855 (1977). But see Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 193 (6111
Cir. 1974).
288 See, e.g., Ratline! v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 574 (4th Cir. 1969) (delay of 18 months too
long), cent denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1970); See (1180 Hickman v. Groesbeck, 389 F. Supp. 769,
775 (D. Utah 1974); Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 326 F. Supp. 250, 262-63 (0. Md.
1971), affil in part and rend in part, 488 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916
(1974).
2 " , See In re Langhorn Sec. Litig., 573 E. Supp. 255, 273 (WD. Okla. 1983): see also 3 A.
1080 	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 31:1027
b. Summary of Causal Elements
Judicial approaches to the private rights of action under rule
10b-5 manifest confused signals as to the importance of cause. On
the one hand, continued interest in reliance as an element of the
plaintiff's action for violations of the duty not to mislead represents
continued preoccupation with "but for" cause. 285 In addition, even
where reliance may be presumed, the courts have refused either to
abandon formally the element of cause-in-fact or to discuss the need
for it in any real depth. 28"
The usual approach to the calculation of damages also dem-
onstrates a traditional interest in causation. Where emphasis is on
the "out-of-pocket" plus "consequential" damage to a plaintiff, the
defendant's ultimate liability effectively is limited. Because there is
no privity requirement under rule 10b-5, no enumeration of per-
missible defendants, and no statutory cap on liability, an impulse to
limit is understandable. Whether it is necessary in cases where lia-
bility would not otherwise be excessive is another question. For
example, 2" where a misrepresentation or omission occurs in con-
nection with the face-to-face sale of a security, the use of either
reliance or damage-related causal limitations does not seem to be
BRIMBERG & L. LowErgyas, supra note 251, § 8.5(513), at 208.3. But see Gordon v. Burr, 506
F.2d 1080, 1083-84 (2d Cir. 1974); Kaye v. Fast Food Operators, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 161, 164
(S.D.N.V. 1983). For other significant restrictions, see Merritt, supra note 11, at 475.
2" This approach arguably camouflages an interest in monitoring plaintiff conduct.
This interpretation is suggested by the relative relaxation of the reliance requirement in both
omissions and open market cases. After all there is less for plaintiffs to do to protect
themselves in these situations. Thus, interest in their conduct correspondingly may be allowed
to decline. Nonetheless, other mechanisms are available to deal with plaintiff conduct. For
instance, clue diligence may be made a separate element of the plaintiff's case, even where
reliance is presumed. See, e.g., White v. Sanders, 880 F.2d 1366, 1367 (11th Cir. 1982); Dupuy
v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005. 1014 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977). Thus, the reliance
requirement may reflect something more.
2S" See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972). In each case, the Supreme Court, without explanation,
described causation as requisite to the plaintiff's case. In some circumstances, courts probably
have not felt compelled to discuss the need for cause simply because alternative available
explanations of the causal connection have had substantial common sense appeal. For in-
stance. where a defendant has made a misrepresentation affecting the public market price
at which transactions in a security take place, causation of transaction price does seem to be
established, regardless of whether the plaintiff was personally exposed at any time to the
misrepresented matter. Where causal linkage exists, it is unnecessary to confront the rationale
for requiring it.
7" It even is arguable that the scienter requirement alone, see supra note 228 and
accompanying text, constitutes such a significant limit on liability that causal contributions to
this goal are, at best, redundant. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
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based on a fear that defendants will encounter unreasonably large
liabilities.288
In contrast to the approaches described above, some courts
have indicated a declining interest in causation by allowing recovery
for breach of the duty to disclose or refrain from trading even
where there is no indication that the plaintiff's market activity was
affected in any way by that of the defendant. In these circumstances,
however, the need to use customary causal devices to limit liability
usually has been obviated by the use of an "unjust enrichment"
measure of damages.2" This approach provides a logical cap on
liability,'" without limiting plaintiffs to compensatory recoveries. It
is, however, a small exception to the general trend.
In summary, then, causal requirements under rule 106-5 ap-
parently have undergone some amount of refashioning and relax-
ation in recent years. Nonetheless, in cases involving rule 1 Ob-5,
the concepts of causation and victim compensation continue to enjoy
a primacy absent in the overall context of the express private rights
of action.
2. The Express Models and Rule 1 Ob-5
a. Rejecting the Common Law in Favor of Legislative Precedent
The rights of action implied on behalf of private plaintiffs
under rule 1 Ob-5 logically should not present marked contrasts to
the express rights without strong justification. As recognized by
courts in the process of implication, the implied rights properly are
regarded as an integral part of the scheme established by the private
rights that Congress has made express."' An attempt at consistency
in this scheme ostensibly has influenced certain aspects of the shape
of the implied rights. For instance, the Supreme Court imposed the
scienter requirement for private actions under rule 106-5, in part,
because of the stated desire to avoid nullifying the procedural re-
288 See supra Part lIA(4) for a discussion of the possible justifications absent such a fear.
"9 See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text. Note, however, that unjust enrich-
ment recoveries may have their own causal requisites. See supra note 282 and accompanying
text.
290 In addition, where the amount disgorged must be shared among a number of
plaintiffs, the grossest appearances of windfall are avoided. See supra note 69 and accom-
panying text.
291 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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strictions of sections I I and 12(2) of the '33 Act. 2"2 Now that such
a requirement exists, however, the specter of nullification has dwin-
dled, if not vanished. Accordingly, future consistency would seem
to depend more on similarities than on differences between implied
and express rights:
Ordinarily, incorporation into implied rights of such traditional
common law concerns as cause might be justified on the basis that
legislative intent is difficult to divine on general matters (i.e., exis-
tence of rights), much less specific ones (i.e., the elements of such
rights). Common law is a convenient refuge because the legislature
presumably was familiar with it and might have "intended" to in-
corporate it by default. 29" In the context of the misrepresentation
rights, however, this explanation falls somewhat flat for several
reasons.
First, "an important purpose of the federal securities statutes
was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available common-law
protections."'" Thus, Congress acted in reaction to the common
law without manifest admiration for its requirements. As a corollary,
the Supreme Court itself occasionally has "emphasized 'the inap-
propriateness of invoking broad common-law barriers to relief
where a private suit serves important public purpose!" 295
Second, where general findings of fundamental legislative pur-
pose are available, these findings can give substantial guidance on
fairly narrow issues otherwise relegable to common law analogies:2%
Some resolutions of narrow issues almost inescapably will contribute
more than others to attainment of given goals. The Supreme Court
has held repeatedly that Congress intended both the '33 Act 217 and
'° Ernst & Ernst v. Hochlelder, 425 U.S. 185, 208-11 (1976); see supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
"' See also infra notes 340-52 for a discussion of the legislative reenactment theory.
" 1 Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388-89 (1983); see disci SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau. 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
2"' Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 307 (1985) (eschewing
rigid common-law barriers in construing the securities laws); see also A.C. Frost & Co. v.
Coeur d'Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38. 43 (1941); cf. Iluddlesion. 459 U.S. at 387 n.23
(1983) (old canons of statutory construction subordinated to the doctrine that courts will
construe an act's details in conformity with its dominating general purpose).
29" Thus, for instance, the Supreme Court's conclusion that recessionary recoveries
tinder section 12(2) should not be adjusted for tax benefits was guided, in part, by the
determination that the '33 Act is intended to do more than insure that defrauded investors
will be compensated. It instead was designed to prevent exploitation of the public. Randall
v. Loftsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 659 (1986) (quoting S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. I
(1933)).
" 7 See, e.g., id.; cf. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622. 638 ti.14 (1987) (policies of securities
laws generally include pnitection of investors as a group, not as individuals).
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the '34 Act2"8 to do more than compensate defrauded investors.
Thus, it appears inappropriate to adhere uncritically to traditional
causal requisites not specifically oriented toward these broader
congressional purposes.
In the past, judicial findings of general congressional purposes
often have been based on evidence provided by the express private
rights. 2" In fact, the express private rights also give impeccable
evidence of favored means of attaining such purposes. Recognition
of this fact is simply a variation of the increasingly popular argu-
ment that, although statutes customarily are regarded as rules to
be applied in specified situations, they also may be useful as per-
suasive analogies.'" This argument has made headway in a variety
of contexts outside the federal securities area.'U 1 In addition, there
has been scattered judicial recognition that the express private
rights for misrepresentation may be used, in at least one regard, as
blueprints for rights that courts imply. Thus, a few courts have
begun to look to the express private rights in order to establish the
appropriate statute of limitations for purposes of rule 10b---5. 3"
Lacking, however, at this point in time, is truly consistent ref-
erence to express private rights as an indication of either legislative
purposes or preferred methods of pursuing them. Indeed, in other
(non-cause related) contexts, the Supreme Court sometimes has
gone so far as to characterize the existence of express rights as a
reason to restrict the use of implied rights. Specifically, the Court
has stated that "when Congress wished to provide a private damage
remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly." 3" This is a
form of argument= a contrario or "negative-opposite construction,"
postulating that legislative enactment of a rule in one situation
implies the opposite for other situations."' This may or may not be
20" See, e.g., Randall, 478 U.S. at 664 ("Congress' aim in enacting the 1934 Act was not
confined solely to compensating defrauded investors. Congress intended to deter fraud and
manipulation in the securities markets, and to ensure full disclosure .....").
299 See supra notes 297-98 for the cited authorities.
"" See Williams, Statutes as Sources of Law Beyond Their Toms in Common -Law Cases, 50
GEO. WASH. Rts. 554, 558 -600 (1982).
" 1 See id.
"2 See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text. Whether this trend will gain mo-
mentum remains to be seen.
3" Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Store, 421 U.S. 723, 724 (1975); see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 1122, 650 (1988)
(stating in context of expansive interpretation of liability under section 12(1) Of the '33 Act,
"kitten Congress wished to create such liability, it had little trouble doing so").
394 See A. LENIIMT, COMMENTS, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 690 n.2
(1949).
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a valid method of deciding which situations are indeed directly
controlled by a statute.305 It is clearly a mistake to employ this
reasoning to preclude the judiciary from adopting an approach in
one context simply because Congress has used it elsewhere. In other
words, once a right has been implied, the time for argumentum a
contrario is past and the shape of the right logically may be patterned
after the models Congress has provided expressly.
b. Application of the Models
i. Generally
A judicial attempt to apply rule 106-5 along the lines of the
express models described in Part IIIA(6) above would seem to be
completely reasonable and, from a standpoint of consistency, quite
desirable. After all, if rule 10b-5 is to be a "catchall" provision,'"
is not to "nullify" the express rights,307 and is to be otherwise con-
sistent with the overall scheme of those rights,3" it would be logical
to apply the rule to parallel the express models with respect to type
of injury presumed and causal showings called for in those fact
patterns upon which the models are based. Thus, where there are
misrepresentations in the context of private trading, the presump-
tions of the face-to-face model should be invoked. Where the mis-
representations are addressed to a public market, the approach of
the open-market model should be followed.
If courts adopted this suggestion, the rule 10b-5 requirement
that the plaintiff prove the defendant's scienters" should suffice to
avoid nullification of any of the express rights for misrepresenta-
3"5 "The canons requiring strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common
law, opposing repeal by implication, holding that expression unites est exclusion alterius or ejusdem
generis, and reading statutes in pail maleria, have all been used to justify judicial inaction
. . But courts employing those canons were interpreting statutes .. . ." Williams, supra
note 300, at 569-70.
See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (Section 10(b)
is a "catchall antifraud provision"); see also supra note 224 and accompanying text.
3" See, e.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 210 (1976); see also supra note
228 and accompanying text.
"5 One of the factors set forth by the Supreme Court for consideration in implying
private remedies is consistency with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme. Con
v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975). Subsequent decisions have interpreted and modified these
factors to some extent. See, e.g., Ashford, supra note 102, at 254-90; Pillai, Negative Implication:
The Demise of Private Rights of Action in the Federal Courts, 47 U. Cm. L. REV. I, 17-36 (1978);
Schneider, Implying Rights and Remedies Under the Federal Securities Acts, 62 N.C.L. REV. 853,
877-96 (1984); see also supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text.
3'9 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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Lion.") The fact that rights under rule 10b-5 would overlap with
the express rights to some extent should be no cause for concern:
as the Supreme Court has said, Tilt is hardly a novel proposition
that the Securities Exchange Act and the Securities Act 'prohibit
some of the same conduct."" Moreover, rule 1013--5 would aug-
ment the '33 Act's expressly granted rights because of its application
both to purchases and to sales. Further, it would augment the '34
Aces express provisions because, in instances where privity is lack-
ing, it nonetheless could be applied to misrepresentations and omis-
sions not contained in a document filed with the SEC.
In addition, rule 106-5 certainly could continue to serve as a
more general catchall for those plaintiffs unable to take advantage
of modeled presumptions or believing themselves to have suffered
an injury greater than that presumed. Thus, for instance, a plaintiff
who entered a subsequently declining public market only because
he or she was misled about a particular security still could seek
damages in excess of those suggested by the express open-market
model. Similarly, a cause of action based on insider trading could
exist even without an express analogue. 312
ii. Specific Comparisons
Some applications of rule 101)-5 indeed have given rise to
results that could have been achieved pursuant to the express mod-
els. Nonetheless, courts typically apply the rule without either spe-
cific recognition of any parallel express rights or the same overt
presumptions. Accordingly, results also have been achieved that
bear no resemblance to those suggested by the models.
One glaring divergence of the current application of rule 101-
5 from the modeled approach comes immediately to mind. Rule
10b-5 presently requires the strictest causal showing to be made by
plaintiffs suing for affirmative misrepresentations in the context of
nonpublic trading. This requirement deviates from the relatively
more favorable treatment afforded by sections 12(2) and 29(b) and
seems unnecessary given the built-in limitations on defendant lia-
„” See Huddhcton, 459 U.S. at 377 ("[Blecause the added burden of proving scienler
attaches to suits under section 10(b), invocation of the section 10(b) remedy will not 'nullify'
the procedural restrictions that apply to the express remedies.").
"' Id, at 376, The Court noted that savings clauses in both the '33 and '34 Acts reject
the notion that express remedies would preempt other rights of action. /d.; see '33 Act § 16,
15 U.S.C. § 77p (1988); '34 Act § 28(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1988).
512 Such an analogue now does exist. See infra Part II IC(2).
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bility afforded by the nonpublic context, even where privity per se
is lacking.
A second possible divergence from the express models involves
the fraud-on-the-market theory recently endorsed by the Supreme
Court in the context of trading in public markets.'" This theory
drastically relaxes the requirement of the plaintiff's causal showing
relative to traditional interpretations of section 18(a). 314
 Such a re-
laxation does present, however, an inexact parallel to section 11. 3 ' 5
Although a strict modeled approach arguably would track the sec-
tion 18 requirements in instances where section 11's inherent limi-
tations on liability cannot .apply—that is, outside the context of a
distribution—the complete historical failure of the section 18(a)
cause of action suggests otherwise. To the extent there is felt to be
some need to impose some additional limit on liability premised on
the section 11 causal model, the scienter requirement itself arguably
could suffice,"'" even though scienter is different in kind from other
more obvious caps.
A third kind of divergence involves the highly fact-specific
demonstration of damages usually required of the plaintiff under
rule 10Ir-5. In contrast, the express models supply presumptions
that vastly simplify the plaintiff's task in many circumstances. The
courts' application of these presumptions in the rule 106-5 context,
at a minimum, would bring order to a greatly confused area.
As these comparisons further substantiate, in fashioning the
causal requisites of rule 106-5, the courts often have responded to
313 Sec supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
314 Justice White recognized this point in his dissent to Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S.
224,260-61 (1988).
315 The parallel is inexact primarily because the presumption or transaction causation
provided for purposes of rule 106-5 is rebuttable. In contrast. section 11 effectively provides
an irrebuttable presumption if the securities in question are purchased prior to the release
of the issuer's 12 month earnings statement. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
316 The scienter requirement indeed can serve to contribute an additional kind of limit
on liability. Cf: Stock Exchange Practices, Hearings on S. 2693 Before Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency. 73d Cong.. 2d Sess. 7186 (1934) (statement of George 0. May) ("If the section
[referring to the predecessor of section 18(a)] is limited to cases of wilful misrepresentation,
I do not suppose anyone would be concerned over a possible undue liability in the measure
of damages."). This recognition dovetails nicely with the common-law tendency to construe
proximate cause expansively where the wrongdoing in question was intentional. See supra
note 45 and accompanying text.
One should note, however, that combining the section II causal model with the scienter
requirement does not translate necessarily to the same rough economic correctness ascribed
to section I I. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49. Any divergence, however, would
seem to represent either a shortfall in desired deterrence (which it is too late to correct), or
a possible balancing of the need to avoid the chilling of communications outside the context
of a '33 Act registration statement.
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ancient drumbeats that Congress largely has forsworn. Oddly, in
those circumstances in which the drumbeats are disregarded (i.e.,
in the context of fraud-on-the-market theory), Congress has pre-
sented at least one example traditionally regarded as dictating an
opposite result. These reversals are puzzling in that current federal
doctrine bases the entire implication process upon a finding of
legislative intent.'" As the following sections of this article illustrate,
recent legislative developments have enhanced the curiosity of the
situation.
C. Quasi-Express Rights
I. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988
The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of
1988 ("ITSFE") became law in November, 1988. 3 " Among other
things, ITSFE codified an express private right of action for those
who traded in a class of security contemporaneously with "any
person who violates any provision of [the '34 Act] or the rules or
regulations thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in
possession of material, non-public information."'" The codification
of this new right was designated section 20A of the '34 Act. 32"
New section 20A provides that the total amount of damages
that plaintiffs may collect thereunder is limited to the amount of
the profit gained or loss avoided in the transaction that is the subject
of the violation."' This amount is subject to offset by any amounts
disgorged in an SEC enforcement proceeding based on the same
transaction. 322 The only additional information provided by section
20A 32" is that it is not intended to affect any other authority of the
SEC or the Attorney General, 324 and that it "shall [not] be construed
to limit or condition the right of any person to bring an action to
enforce a requirement of this title or the availability of any cause of
5 ' 5 See infra text accompanying note 103.
)'" 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988).
51" Id. § 78t-1
"" Id.
52 ' Id. § 78(-1 00).
" 5 Id. § 78t-1(b)(2).
5" The provision also does contain, however, its own five-year statute of limitations. Id.
§ 781-19)1(4). II also has provisions dealing with joint and several liability, id. § 78t-1(c)„and
controlling person liability, id. § 78t—l(b)(3).
"4 Id. 	 78t-1(e).
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action implied from a provision of this title."325 In approving ITSFE, the
relevant House Committee clearly felt that it was unnecessary to
specifically delineate the activities it intended to address, saying "the
Committee . . . declined to include a statutory definition [because]
... the court-drawn parameters of insider trading [under rule I Ob-
5] have established clear guidelines ... and ... a statutory definition
could potentially be narrowing . . . . Accordingly, the Committee
does not intend to alter the substantive law."326 The Committee
further endorsed the general activity of courts in this area with the
following language:
The Committee's intention . . . was to avoid creating an
express private cause of action which might have the un-
intended effect of freezing the law or in any way restrict-
ing the potential rights of action which have been implied
by the courts in this area. Rather, the Committee wanted to
give the courts leeway to develop such private rights of action in
an expansive fashion in the future.3"
Nonetheless, the report reveals that "the codification of a right of
action for contemporaneous traders is specifically intended to over-
Id. § 78t-1(d) (emphasis added).
32" H.R. REP. No. 100-910, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 7 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6043, 6048 (1988). A more complete quotation is as follows:
While cognizant of the importance of providing clear guidelines for behavior
which may be subject to stiff criminal and civil penalties, the Committee never-
theless declined to include a statutory definition in this bill for several reasons.
First, the Committee believed that the court-drawn parameters of insider trading
[under rule I 06-5] have established clear guidelines for the vast majority of tradi-
tional insider trading cases, and that a statutory definition could potentially be
narrowing, and in an unintended manner facilitate schemes to evade the law.
Second, the Committee did not believe that the lack of consensus over the
proper delineation of an insider trading definition should impede progress on
the needed enforcement reforms encompassed within this legislation. Accord-
ingly, the Committee does not intend to alter the substantive law with respect to insider
trading with this legislation. The legal principles governing insider trading cases
are well-established and widely known.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 27 (emphasis added). Even more broadly, the Committee stated:
Despite the absence of explicit statutory language for private rights of action
outside of the conteniporaneous trader plaintiff situation, the Committee rec-
ognized that there clearly are injuries caused by insider trading to others beyond
contemporaneous traders. In the view of the Committee, section 10(b), rule
10b-5, and other relevant provisions of the Exchange Act have sufficient flex-
ibility to recognize and protect any person defrauded, or harmed by a violation
of any provision of this title or the rules or regulation thereunder by another
person's purchasing or selling a security while in the possession of material,
non-public in 	 or communicating such in 	 to others.
Id. at 27-28.
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turn court cases which have precluded recovery for plaintiffs where
the defendant's violation is premised upon the misappropriation
theory."328
Quite simply, then, Congress specifically has acknowledged the
existence of implied private rights under rule 101)-5, has approved
them, and has encouraged their further development. Congress
evidently intended its codification of' an express private right for
contemporaneous traders primarily to correct the conservative ap-
plication of the misappropriation theory in private rights of action.
2. The Private Right for Contemporaneous Traders
Section 20A codifies the previously implied right to sue for
violations of the duty to disclose or refrain from trading. It con-
tributes, however, some important developments. First, the duty to
disclose or refrain arises from the misappropriation of information
despite the context of the private action."9 Second, and very sig-
nificantly, there is absolutely no requirement of injury to the plain-
tiff, let alone any causal link between the defendant's trading and
such injury. Damages are determined strictly by reference to the
defendant's gain or loss avoided. 3" Where a plaintiff specifically is
injured by the defendant's activity, however, he or she is permitted
to sue for additional damages in a congressionally-endorsed action
brought under unamended rule I Ob-5 or sonic other relevant pro-
vision.
Adoption of section 20A constitutes an effective response of
"Who cares?" to the contention that, at least in open market con-
texts, an insider's trading neither induces anyone else to trade (i.e.
causes transactions) nor necessarily has significant impact on the
prices at which particular trades occur (i.e. causes transaction
prices).""I Thus, the right for contemporaneous traders is a means
of policing the laws of insider trading. It is not related to plaintiff
compensation, 332 even though some of the private attorneys general
32" M. at 26 (emphasis added).
"29 See mtpra note 328 and accompanying text.
"30 See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
"' See wpm note 258 and accompanying text.
"9 The primarily deterrent emphasis of section 20A is not at all puzzling, given the
recent outcry against the practice of insider trading and the fact that. at least when the
penalized insider traded in a public market, no single contemporaneous investor is ;WI to
receive much of a windfall. See generally 71/M1 note 69. In view of this hitter phenomenon,
die utility of such a cause of action will depend on the incentive of an attorney to organize
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designated actually may have been harmed by the defendants'
wrongful acts. Of course, this approach is supported by legislative
precedent. In fact, it represents only a moderate variation from the
express rights previously discussed.""
3. The Systemic Model—Causation Free
New section 20A of the '34 Act accordingly contributes a third
model based 'on congressionally recognized private actions. This
model clearly reflects the understanding that certain kinds of activ-
ity can impose systemic damages entirely above and beyond those
caused to any individual investor. The presumed injury in this case
(as reflected by the chosen measure of damages) is that the defen-
dant has gained illicitly, 33 't thereby offending social mores and im-
pairing investor confidence. 335 Neither transaction causation nor
transaction price causation is of any relevance. This new model, like
those that have preceded it, has implications for rule I 01)-5.
Before addressing the specifics of rule 10b-5, however, it is
useful to summarize the evidence that the new model of section
20A presents as to congressional maneuvering among competing
philosophical and analytical approaches. For instance, once again,
Congress evidently eschews the ultra-individualist, minimalist state
approach to the role of causation referred to in Part IIA(3) above.
Section 20A also makes it clear that Congress declines to embrace
strict economic analysis as described in Part I IA(5). Although the
earlier express models often have supplied damage measures that
may be described as more or less "economically correct,""" Congress
now has chosen to condemn strongly the activity of insider trading.
a class action in many cases. It therefore can be regarded as a "private" cause of action only
in a limited sense.
For an analysis of the moral underpinnings of the anti-insider trading outcry. see Note.
Outsider Trading—Moralny and the taw of Securities Fraud, 77 Geo. 181,193-209 (1988).
The cultural, as well as practical, distaste fur insider trading may be illustrated by the former
respectability of this practice in japan and the current pressures for reform in light of
western opinion. See. e.g., Sanger, Insider Trading the Japanese Way, N.V. Times, Aug. 10,1988,
at DI. col. 3 (late city final ed.).
" 3 See also supra note 97, discussing the private right of action under section 16(b) of
the '34 Act.
"4 In this sense, the systemic model is not causation free; it is, however, the defendant's
gaits, not the plaintiff's injury, that is scrutinized for causal links.
335 Investor risk aversion logically is minimized by indications that die risk of loss is less
titan the unpinned chances of breaking even or gaining. Assuming no general ecomnnic
decline, this goal can be furthered by preventing any substantial group from procuring a
systematized informatitmal advantage.
See supra text accompanying notes I49 and 178.
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In contrast, the proponents of strict economic analysis typically have
concluded that insider trading is either inoffensive or beneficial."'
Although no single favored congressional philosophy readily
appears, in creating express rights, Congress obviously attempts to
appeal both to popular morality and common sense. It has erected
a structure pursuant to which those who may be publicly perceived
as wrongdoers are penalized and those collecting the penalties are
the persons most likely to have been injured. The liability imposed
occasionally will equal either the amount lost by the injured or the
amount gained by the wrongdoer. More importantly, it always will
be limited in general accord with common sense. The system in
which these ends are achieved may be lacking in philosophical
aesthetics, but it certainly is not irrational. Without pretense of
precision, the express rights provide that reasonably limited liability
may be imposed fairly easily in a multiplicity of cases. The system
leaves some gaps, however, through inadvertence or lack of fore-
sight."'"
4. Legislative Reenactment and the Interaction of Section 20A
and Rule 10b---5
The adoption of section 20A represents an anomalous situation
in which Congress has made the judicial activity involved in the
development of an implied right absolutely critical to an express
private right of action. This situation has the effect of linking the
3" In this context, economic arguments have taken specialized forms. Sonic commen-
tators argue that the ability to trade on inside information provides valuable compensation
incentives to managerial employees. See, e.g., Carlton & Fische!, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 869-72 (198:3). Others suggest that insider trading may have
beneficial informational effects on market prices. Id. at 868. In general, however. much of
the writing on this subject may he described as fervently anti-regulation.
For a brief sampling of the literature favoring insider trading, see H. MANNE, INSIDER
TRADING AND rue STOCK MARKET 131 (1966); Carbon & Fischel, supra; Ross, The Determination
of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON. 23, 23-25 (1977);
Mantle, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. Rev. 547, 549-88 (1970). For
counterarguments, see, e.g., Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading
and the Stock Market, 53 VA. I.. REV. 1425, 1438-57 (1967); Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic
Information on Impersonal Stork Markets: Who Is Harmed and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule
105-5, 54 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1217, 1221-48 (1981) (discussing benefits and harms of insider
trading without taking a position on prohibition).
"8 The failure of the section 18(a) cause of action inadvertently created one such gap.
See supra text following note 195. Other gaps have arisen through passage of time. Cf:
Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 315 (1985) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 98-355, 9801 Cong., 2d Sess. at 6'(1983)) ("In recent years, the securities markets have
grown dramatically' in size and complexity, while Commission enforcement resources have
declined.").
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history and the future of these rights. In effect, Congress might be
said to have "quasi-expressed," rather than expressed, the section
20A cause of action. Moreover, one cannot ignore the ringing en-
dorsement given to future judicial activism in the area of private
rights under the '34 Act in general, and rule I Ob-5 in particular.
The existence of implied private rights under rule 10b--5 now is
not only beyond "peradventure,""" these rights themselves might
be regarded as "quasi-expressed."
Labels aside, the effect on rule I Ob-5 of the legislative approach
taken in adopting section 20A must be understood in the context
of the legislative reenactment theory. The primary thrust of this
principle of statutory construction is that when a reenacted statute
fails to change the prevailing administrative or judicial interpreta-
tion of some earlier version of that statute, the construction in
question"° is legislatively endorsed."' Congress is presumed to be
generally aware of such interpretations;342 reenactment of a statute
after favorable discussion in committee hearings of a relevant in-
terpretation logically conveys particularly strong indicia of ap-
proval.343 Courts regard legislative endorsement as conclusive when
repeated reenactments follow notorious interpretations."'
In adopting section 20A, Congress predicated various conse-
quences upon the occurrence of insider trading violations defined
by reference to pre-existing provisions of the '34 Act.345 Congres-
s" See supra note 222 awl accompanying text.
34° This article draws no distinctions between the processes of interpretation and con-
struction.
341 Herman & MacLean v. Fluclilleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378-79 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434
U.S. 575, 580-81 (1978); See also 2A C. SANDS, STATUITS AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 49.09 (4th ed. 1973): Agusii. The Effect of Prior Judicial and Administrative Constructions an
Codification of Preexisting Federal Statutes: The Case of the Federal Securities Code, 15 I4Aav. j. ON
Lccas. 367 (1978).
347 See generally Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982).
3" Cl United States v. Federal Maritime Conmin, 694 F.2d 793, 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
See, e.g., Wehrly v. United States, 808 F.2d 1311, 1315 (90.1 Cir. 1986); Ward v.
Commissioner of IRS, 784 F.2d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1986).
See supra notes 319 -and 326 and accompanying text. Congress also had used this
approach in legislatitm adopted in 1984. This earlier legislation was the Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984 (ITSA). 15 § 78u(d)(2) (1988). Although it did not address
private rights of action, ITSA significantly enhanced the pre-existing penalties for violations
of the '34 Act involving the use of nonpublic inkrmation. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (1988).
The violations in question were those construed by the judiciary under rule 106-5. "Again,
Congress would not have effectively quadrupled the penalties for insider trading had they
been wholly dissatisfied with the underlying approach to the imposition of liability." Lange-
vet ift, Commentary—The Insider Trading Sanctions Art of 1984 and Its Effect on Existing Law, 37
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sional action thus may be regarded as the theoretical equivalent of
reenactment of the pre-existing sections as they relate to insider
trading. These provisions already had enjoyed significant adminis-
trative and judicial attention. In fact, the original concept of insider
trading was the result of judicial interpretation of section 10(b) and
rule 10b-5. 346
The 1988 legislation thus presented a natural opportunity to
address prior judicial developments in the area of insider trading
in violation ol' rule 10b-5. Legislative history indicates both com-
plete cognizance of this opportunity and the stated desire to redirect
the courts in only one major regard. Thus, Congress demonstrated
its desire for wholehearted application of the misappropriation the-
ory, both in government enforcement contexts and in private rights
of action?"
More significantly for purposes of this article, however, Con-
gress also endorsed, without fanfare, one of the previously com-
peting approaches"' to the treatment of cause in the insider trading
context—selecting, of course, a version that is relatively causation-
free?" If courts do not attend to this endorsement, yet another
example of rule 1013-5 divergence from an express model will re
suit. In light of the arguments made in Part IIIB above, such
divergence clearly would be inappropriate.
The extent to which rule 10b-5 developments not strictly re-
lating to insider trading have enjoyed reenactment and/or endorse-
ment is not quite so obvious. Legislative action by amendment of
one part of a law sometimes has suggested approval of interpreta-
tions relating to unchanged provisions?" More generally, legislative
inaction following a well-known course of statutory interpretation
has been regarded as some evidence that the legislature has ac-
quiesced in that interpretation."' At the same time, however, leg-
VANn. L. REv. 1273, 1286 (1984). For general discussion of the 1984 legislation, see id. at
1286-87; Note, A Critique of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 71 VA. L. REV. 455,
469-70 (1985).
31" See supra notes 251-61 and accompanying text.
3^7 See supra note 328 and accompanying text.
" 18 See supra notes 260-61 and accompanying text.
3" See supra note 330 and accompanying text. lint see supra note 334.
"" United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1948); Markham v. Cabell, 326 U.S.
404, 411 (1945); see also 2A C. SANDS, supra note 34I, 49.10.
3" For instance, in Herman & MacLean v. Iloddleston, the Supreme Court held that
congressional enactment of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. 94-29, 89 Stat.
97, without amendment of section 10(h), suggested ratification of well-established judicial
interpretations of rule 101)-5. 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1985). Similarly, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
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islative inaction has sometimes been called a "poor beacon to fol-
l ow: , 352
Approval of specific judicial developments through legislative
reenactment is less conclusive in the non-insider trading context
than in the case of the rules relating to insider trading. Thus, for
instance, Congress has not endorsed definitively either the courts'
continuing Fascination with cause as an intrinsic (if sometimes for-
mal) element of the plaintiff's case under rule 10b-5 or the spas-
modically relaxing approach to reliance.""
Nonetheless, Congress has acknowledged and approved specif-
ically the general existence of implied actions under rule I Ob-5.
Moreover, Congress clearly has indicated that it believes the courts
acted properly in deriving a private right against inside traders, and
wished only that they had acted more expansively. This indication
arguably constitutes approval of the concept of causal relaxation
under rule 10b-5. This argument is enhanced by the fact that
Congress itself omitted cause as an element of the section 20A action
that was intended primarily to expand use of the misappropriation
theory and otherwise to incorporate pre-existing law.
5. The Models Revisited
The form of argument involving the use of models has been
simple enough thus far: Congress and the courts should be working
in alignment but have failed to do so in regard to cause. It seems
advisable that the courts look to the causal models provided by the
express rights when answering questions raised in the context of
rule 10b-5. The picture is greatly complicated, however, by the fact
that Congress has become fainthearted in assuming responsibility
for the misrepresentation rights. Congress suggests that it would
like these rights enlarged, but seems loathe to take the lead for fear
the Crnirt noted that "ffludicial interpretathm and application, legislative acquiescence and
the passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a
violation of section 10(b) and rule 10h-5 and constitutes an essential tool for enforcement
of the 1934 Act's requirements." 485 U.S. 224, 229 (1987). See also, e.g.. Canada Packers,
Ltd. v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 385 U.S. 182, 186-87 (1966); United Slates v. Shreveport
Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 84 (1932); 2A C. SANDS, SUpra note 341, § 49.10.
3" American Trucking Ass'ns v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967); see also
R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 181 (1975).
3" This observation is especially true because changing times and markets may present
circumstances and possibilities not contemplated by either courts or Congress at earlier dates.
Cf. Huddleston, 459 U.S. at 388 (typical context in which common-law doctrines of misrepre-
sentation developed was light-years from current securities market).
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of inadvertently narrowing what the courts might otherwise succeed
in expanding. In contrast, the most recent congressional response
to judicial activism in the rule I Ob-5 area could be described as
both admiring and encouraging.
Thus, rule 10b-5 now may be capable of making a legitimate
contribution of its own 354 to an understanding of congressional
design for the private misrepresentation rights.'" This contribution
would be a key in reconciling the models based on the express
private rights for misrepresentation and at least some past instances
in which courts divergently have applied rule 101r-5. These in-
stances notably would include the use of the fraud-on-the-market
theory."5 " As already discussed, this theory tends toward the express
open-market model provided by section 11, but substantially relaxes
the requirement of the plaintiff's causal showing relative to the
arguably more relevant model provided by section 18(a). if private
actions under rule 101)-5 now possess some measure of congres-
sional endorsement, this development is cause for at least limited
celebration, rather than any serious concern.""
Assuming that Congress believes cause to be a means rather
than an end, that Congress would like expansion of private misre-
presentation rights and that. relaxation of causal elements typically
will expand, not contract, such private rights, relaxation of causal
requirements beyond those provided by any particular express
model clearly would be consistent with legislative objectives." 8 This
change particularly would be true relative to the castrated model
provided by section 18(a). In contrast, however, the continued in-
"" Prior acknowledgments of rule 10b-5's independent life have not prominently fea-
tured its legitimacy. See, e.g., I.. Loss, supra note 103, at 726 Ca horse of dubious pedigree
but very fleet of foot"); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,737 (1975)
(Rehnquist, C .f.) ("judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn");
Painter, The Use of Rule I01,--5 in Derivative Actions, in EMERGING FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS:
PonNinm. LIABILITY, 37 (V. Nording ed. 1960) (like a medieval alchemist's "universal sol-
vent," so potent that it dissolves every container employed to hold it).
"5 This recognition would, as an initial matter, relieve what would otherwise be a niildly
unconifiniable "chicken and egg" problem with the third tnodd itself. After all, judicial
development or a cause Of action based on inside trading without disclosure predated express
recognition of any similar right. In add ition, there may be other applications of rule 10b-5
that have limited formal parallel to express private rights. See, e.g., L. Loss, Supra note 103,
at 811-20 for a discussion of the "shingle" theory of broker liability.
"6 Sec supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
357 The fraud-on-the-market theory still might he criticized for failing to go as far as
die model provided by section 1 I of the '33 Act. The theory's rebuttability arguably is offset,
however, by its lack of a tracing requirement or overall cap on liability.
3"a This argument is bu ttressed by, but does not depend upon, the existence of the
scienter requirement. See Slifra text accompanying note 316.
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sistence on proof of reliance in nonpublic contexts under rule 10b-
5 still cannot be justified; for that matter, neither can the demand
for fact-specific damage showings. In light of congressional enthu-
siasm for rule 106-5 expansion, the rule's non-scienter require-
ments should not be interpreted more restrictively than those of
the parallel express rights.35"
IV. CRITICISM AND CONCLUSION
At present, the express, implied, and quasi-express rights for
misrepresentation are complicated and sometimes inconsistent. In
fact, the prevailing impression of such rights seems to be that they
are an expanding morass of traps for the unwary, giving rise to a
need for hypertechnical expertise and incessant litigation.""
One way in which the various rights diverge is with respect to
their causal requisites. In cases involving the rights statutorily ad-
dressed by Congress,3" these variations are understandable as
means to ends. This is true even though the causal limitations of
section 18(a), in practice, have been too extreme. With respect to
implied rights under rule 101)-5, however, the variations are neither
consistent within applications of the rule nor understandable in the
context of the larger structure of private rights. Thus, for instance,
no real predictability exists in the calculation of damages. Moreover,
reliance requirements are stricter in nonpublic than in public con-
texts, a complete reversal of the express scheme.
This article has attempted to demonstrate that the role played
by causation in the misrepresentation rights can be rationalized
through two fairly simple expedients. First, the federal judiciary
should recognize that the express rights for misrepresentation pro-
-r he fact that judicial constructions of rule 101)-5 from time to time have outstripped
the parallel express rights without any semblance of congressional 01jjection may suggest an
additional use for the rule in shaping the overall scheme kw misrepresentation rights. Thus,
just as the more express rights may make important logical contributions to the shape of
future rule I Ob-5 developments, expansive rule I 013-.5 constructions might be useful in
shaping judicial interpretations of the express rights, at least in those circumstances in which
statutory language is not compelling. For instance, this could even encourage relaxation of
Use onwts' especially rigid its of the reliance requirement under section I8(a).
Despite the lack of a scienter requirement under that section, such relaxation should not
result in undesirable levels of liability: this is true because of the fairly easy "good faith and
no knowledge" defense. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
'"" Analysts are in virtually unanimous agreement on this point. For an example of the
American Law Institute's attempted overhaul of all aspects of the federal securities laws, see
FEn. Sit.c. CODE (1980).
""' These include the express rights discussed in I'art 111A, supra, and new section 20A.
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vide both strong indicia of congressional purposes and useful mod-
els for attainment of those purposes. Second, this same judiciary
should acknowledge the recent directive issued by Congress to ex-
pand the usefulness of the implied rights. These factors in combi-
nation suggest that the courts could relax implied causal requisites
relative to those of the express models, but should not interpret
these requisites more restrictively than their express analogues.
Nonetheless, there may be concern that the second rationalizing
step accepts and builds upon the method of congressional and
judicial interaction referred to earlier in this article as "quasi-ex-
pression." This acceptance is based on practical considerations: 312
recent indications suggest that all but the most general future de-
velopments in the scheme of private rights are primarily in the
hands of the courts. In fact, Congress clearly seems to fear impair-
ing the judiciary's ability to deal expansively with private rights and
doubts its own ability in this regard. In other words, quasi-expres-
sion quite possibly is the method of future law-making that Congress
will favor.
This form of law-making is frankly less than ideal. At one time,
Congress's freehanded delegation to the courts even might have
run afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. 363 Although, at
present, this does not seem to be the case, 364 "quasi-expression"
does appear to have other drawbacks.
"[Gluidance for a positive legal scheme must either rub elbows with that scheme or
grow chimerical." K. LLEWELLYN. JURISPRUDENCE (REALISM IN DIEMIV AND PRACTICE) 114
(1962).
The doctrine of sepannion of powers dictates that the legislature cannot delegate
the legislative 11111011M to the judiciary. I C. SANDS, supra note 34 I. § 4.06. Despite consid-
erable overlap, the legislative function has been distinguished from the adjudicative on several
bases. The legislative Function is said to invo lve the creation of "general rules" affecting a
"general class,- operating prospectively, and cleating "primary rights" formerly unavailable.
§ 1.06 at I I; see, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229 (1908). The
adjudicative function has been described as involving determinations operating retroactively
on limited groups and creating "secondary rights" upon the basis of a pre-existing primary
right. C. SANDS, supra note 341, § 1.06 at II. Although courts thus might be said to be
legislating in extending common-law rights, objections are most apt to be raised where
legislative techniques and the wishes of the people have been ignored. Id. at 12; see Dittoe,
Statutory Revision by Common Law Courts and the Nature of Legislative Decision Making—A Response
to Professor Calabresi, 28 Sr. Louts U.L.I. 235 (1984); Peck, Comments on judicial Creativity, 69
IOWA L. REV. 1, 31-45 (1983). See Breitel, The Lawmakers, 65 Count. L. REV. 749, 772-76
(1965), for a discussion of prudent 1111111(11101IS on judicial activism; see also Baker v. Cam 369
U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Kurland, The Supreme Court 1963 Term—
Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Tide to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the
Government, 78 lIARV. L. REY. 143 (1964); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 Malty. L. REV. I (1959).
SiI At present, the legislature may permit the courts to determine certain conditions
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As an initial matter, quasi-expression arguably calls on courts
to do something they are not well suited to do. The traditional
judicial role has been adjudication of disputes on the basis of infor-
mation presented by litigants. Although this process has had inev-
itable, and extremely useful, precedential effect, it is not designed
to deal efficiently with significant policy issues. For instance, there
is a risk that all relevant arguments, statistics, etc., will not be mus-
tered in any given case. 365 Moreover, a strong possibility exists that
inter-party equities in particular cases will skew outcomes from a
broader policy perspective.'" 56 Finally, the case-by-case decision-mak-
ing process simply lacks clarity and moves slowly; it cannot respond
quickly to currently pressing problems.
At least some of these criticisms presuppose, however, that the
main result desired by Congress is speedy eradication of misrepre-
sentation-related offenses. If, instead, the primary desired result is
enhanced public confidence, quasi-expression accompanied by some
amount of public fanfare is not a had solution. Thus, for example,
under which a statute may apply, provided that it outlines legislative policy and fixes con-
trolling principles. See generally Common Council of Albany v. Town Board of Bethlehem,
23 A.D.2d 381, 261 N.V.S.2d 144 (1965). This is in accord with the modern view allowing
the exercise by one branch or government of powers of another when it is essential to the
discharge of the authority of the exercising branch, is not an assumption of the other branch's
whole power, and does not imperil individual liberty. Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155,
162-63 (1955): 1 C. SAN us, supra note 341, § 3.06, at 53; Pound, The Place of a judicial): in a
Democratic Polity, 27 A.B.A. J. 113. 136 (1941); cl Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113,
125 (1940); United States v. Rock Royal Co-op, Inc.. 307 U.S. 533, 574 (1929). The com-
monplace ... assumes the rightness of courts in making interstitial law, filling gaps in the
statutory and decisional rules, and at a snaillike pace giving some forward movement to the
developing law." Breitel, supra note 363, at 765 (noting failure of judiciary to circumscribe
in this 111:11111CD and calling for restraint).
Thus, separation of powers limits have not prevented courts from extending the scope
of a statute to include implied consequences, such as the existence of private rights. 2A C.
SANDS, supra note 341, §§ 55.02, 55.05. The willingness to engage in implication is justified
on the grounds that it is not possible, much less practical, for the legislature to specify all
the effects of a statute in all circumstances. Id. Moreover, the danger of judicial activism
through implication seems limited. To the extent the implication process is premised oti
legislative intent, it is a fairly simple matter for the legislature to redress unwanted results.
This ratioliale clearly is related in spirit to the legislative reenactment theory. See generally.
Creswell, The Separation of Poulos Implications of Implied Rights of Action, 34 MERCER L. REV.
973 (1983).
3"5 For discussion of this type or limitation on judicial decision-making ability in the
context of the political question doctrine, see &Flavin ., judicial Review and the Political Question:
A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE LI. 517, 566-96 (1966); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DAN-
GEROUS BRANCH CII.4 09(12) (discussing various mechanisms of judicial restraint).
3C'h For an attempt to address this phenomenon, sce the Supreme Court's approach to
in pari delicto defenses in federal securities contexts. Cf. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 654-
55 (1988); Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299, 318-19 (1985).
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if identifiable individuals are not actually suffering harm caused by
inside traders,367 the only step immediately required to respond to
the systemic injury of lack of confidence is a statement that someone
is addressing the problem of insider trading. Thereafter, inside
traders must eventually be caught and punished to preserve the
desired effect, but the urgency of this phase may not be pressing.
In addition, the arguments premised on judicial ineptness as-
sume the virtues of certainty to be self-evident. In fact, temporary
lack of clear-cut rules itself may have certain virtues. Obscurity
avoids an inadvertent narrowing of proscribed activities and has a
deterrent effect all of its own. 368 Thus, persons contemplating ac-
tions that might or might not give rise to legal consequences simply
may abstain from the questionable behavior, saving both enforce-
ment effort and judicial resources. Thus, obscurity may have net
benefits if the value of the deterred, albeit arguably lawful, behavior
is low.
The most important response, however, to criticisms based on
the deficiencies of courts in addressing general policy matters is the
observation that, in the field of securities regulation, general policy
is one of the few things as to which Congress has been relatively
clear. Congressional delegation of the execution of this policy to the
courts may result in a few legal goatpaths, but conscientious judicial
reading of congressional signposts should keep those paths mean-
dering in the right direction.
Perhaps the larger problems presented by Congress's recent
use of quasi-expression arise not because it has specified broad goals
and then delegated the detail work to the courts, but because Con-
gress has concealed somewhat the act of delegation itself. This
concealment results from the use of legislative history, rather than
statutory language, to deliver directives to the judiciary.
Legislative history is a valuable interpretive tool but, as a matter
of course, it should not be favored over statutory language for
matters of real significance. For one thing, the legislative history
approach arguably fails to give meaningful notice either to generally
357 See note 260 and accompanying text.
11138 See Haggett v. Rollin, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) ("Those ... sensitive to the perils
posed by ... indefinite language avoid the risk ... only by restricting their conduct to that
which is unquestionably sale."); see also G, Guyruka, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1156 (11th ed.
1985) (alluding to chilling effect of vague iugubtions); Amsterdam, The Void-Jiff- Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Gond, 109 U. PA. L. Rev. 67, 89-96 (1960) (general discussion of
vagueness (ioctrine). Note, however, that this article is not attempting to create or respond
to any asserticm of unconstitutional vagueness.
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interested congressional constituencies or to individuals whose legal
postures may be affected directly by law-making in the relevant
area.369 For another, courts easily may miss or ignore legislative
history, particularly where the history in question is associated spe-
cifically with one rather specialized provision but purports to ad-
dress the interpretation of other sections."° Such a situation is
presented by the use of the legislative history relating to new section
20A to endorse interpretations of section 10(b) and rule 106-5.
In fact, Congress should be able to develop and articulate more
overt expressions of goals without restricting judicial latitude to
achieve them. For instance, legislative history suggests that private
causes of action for insider trading are supposed to supplement
SEC enforcement activities. In this instance, section 20A itself might
have announced directly that such actions serve a deterrent, rather
than a compensatory, function, and that all questions not addressed
specifically by the statute should be resolved accordingly. This type
of expression in other contexts, especially that of section I 0(b), also
would be useful."' If such policy statements were more regular
landmarks of the securities landscape, it is possible that major in-
consistencies in causal and other requirements could be entirely
avoided. 372
'"9 "The maxim that people are held to know the law becomes unfair concerning portions
of the law which are essentially undiscoverable. Basing decisions of statutory interpretation
on historical events that are, practically speaking, obscured from the awareness of persons
not directly involved in the legislative process has the character of enforcing secret laws." 2A
C. SANDS, WPM note 341, 48.02, at 284.
370 Glowing words about the misappropriation theory contained in the history of the
Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 apparently had little effect on the Supreme Court's
consideration of the subject in 1987 in the case of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19,
24 (1987); see also supra note 258. Carpenter was working its way through the lower courts at
the time the 1984 legislation was enacted. It was cited in the legislative history as a prime
example of the type of abuse that Congress wished to penalize. See 130 Cong. Rec. 117757
(daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Dingell); The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1983, Senate Hearings on HR 559 Before the Subcommittee on Securities, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
37 (1984). The Supreme Court, however, seems to have been unimpressed and has evenly
split on the validity of the misappropriation theory, even in the context of SEC enforcement.
97 ' For instance, the preamble to section 16(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78p(b) (1988),
has been a valuable contribution to that provision's jurisprudence. See, e.g., Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943). Nonetheless,
section I 6(b)'s preamble has not dispelled all confusion about the circumstances in which the
statute is to be applied. See generally Block & Barton, Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act: An
Archaic Insider Trading Statute in Need of Reform, 12 SEC. REG. L.J. 203 (1984); Tomlinson,
Section 16(b): A Single Analysis of Purchases and Sales—Merging the Objective and Pragmatic
Analyses, 1981 Dumr. L.J. 941 (1981); Wentz, Refining a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach to
Section 16(6) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 221 (1975).
' 77 Not all statements of purpose, however, will be helpful. For example, the introduction
to the '34 Act itself is more general than might be desired. 15 U.S.C. 78b (1988).
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Nonetheless, the most immediately practical observation as to
improvement either in the role of cause in the private misrepresen-
tation rights, or in general federal securities law-making, must be
directed to the federal courts. This observation may be summarized
as follows: in this day and age, it is disingenuous for a court to take
the position that "[w]hen Congress wished to create such liability, it
had little trouble doing so."'" In fact, Congress recently has expe-
rienced great difficulty in stating exactly what it wishes in the se-
curities field. At least for the present, if congressional intent is to
be of any meaning in this area, judicial sensitivity to even the most
subtle congressional signal must be acute.
17,1 Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 650 (1988); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redingtou,
442 U.S. 560. 572 (1979) ("(W1hen Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy, it
knew how to do Si) and did so expressly."); supra note 303 and accompanying texi,
